In Ripoli v. Department of Human Services, Office of Veterans Services, No. 23-1970, 2024 WL 5116941 (1st Cir. Dec. 16, 2024), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, inter alia, vacated the lower court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendant on plaintiff’s disparate treatment discrimination claims.
From the decision:
Our inquiry begins with the appellant’s prima facie case. Nobody seriously disputes that the appellant established the first three elements of her prima facie case: she is both female and lesbian, she was amply qualified for her role as Associate Director of the OVA, and she was terminated from that position. As to the fourth element of her prima facie case, she insists that a litany of factors, when viewed together, raise a genuine issue regarding whether she was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. For instance, the appellant was the only female and only gay employee on the OVA’s executive team, and she was the only employee who was fired; there was no compelling impetus, budgetary or otherwise, to send her packing; the State had a continuing need for her work and skills; she was arguably replaced by a less-qualified heterosexual male; and the State kept her in the dark about the availability of the SPPCA role.
While the court agreed with the defendant that it articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating her employment, plaintiff “has presented evidence that raises questions as to whether these asserted justifications were — separately or in combination — the motivating factors for this phase of the reorganization” and that it was for the factfinder “to determine whether or not the asserted justifications are pretextual.”
The court thus concluded:
At each stage of Yarn’s reorganization and the ensuing creation of the SPPCA role, the appellant was either kept in the dark, outright disadvantaged, or both. Although a factfinder could find that the outcome for the appellant was merely collateral damage resulting from appropriate State action, such a finding is not compelled by the evidence. A factfinder could just as easily conclude that the appellant’s discharge was the product of discrimination. This is the classic situation, then, in which a factfinder — and not a judge acting at summary judgment — should weigh the evidence and make a final determination.
This decision thus aptly illustrates the fact-sensitive nature of discrimination claims, and that “smoking gun” evidence is not required.