In Alston v. New York City Department of Education, 24 Civ. 0009 (DEH), 2025 WL 104407 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s discriminatory termination claims.
The court explained and applied the so-called “cat’s paw” theory of liability. From the decision:
Plaintiff’s various employment discrimination claims concerning her termination require that she allege that it was motivated or caused by discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 79 (2d Cir. 2023) (under Title VII, a plaintiff alleging an employment discrimination claim must allege that “the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent”); Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 804 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2015) (under the ADA, a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim must allege that an “adverse action was imposed because of her disability”); Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff must allege “differential treatment—that she is treated ‘less well’ because of a discriminatory intent”); Mumin v. City of New York, No. 23 Civ. 03932, 2024 WL 5146085, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2024) (legal standards under the NYSHRL are now the same as under the NYCHRL).
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege that her termination was motivated by discrimination. See Defs. Mem. 16-21. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding discriminatory motive center on two individual defendants: Defendant Rivers, who allegedly harassed her, see Pl. Mem. 12-13; and her direct supervisor Defendant Baptiste, who allegedly made several comments regarding Plaintiff’s anxiety disorder, see id. at 13 (citing SAC ¶¶ 108-14). Defendants, however, argue that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding these two defendants are insufficient to create an inference that her termination was motivated by discrimination, because neither Rivers nor Baptiste is alleged to have played a role in her termination, and their discrimination cannot be imputed to Defendant Glass, who made the actual decision to terminate her. See Defs. Mem. at 19-21.
Plaintiff responds by arguing that, under a “cat’s paw” theory of liability, a “discriminatory termination claim can proceed against an employer who negligently permitted the plaintiff’s co-worker, a low-level employee harboring discriminatory intent, to induce the plaintiff’s termination.” Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 2016). While that is true, there are no allegations in the SAC that Baptiste or Rivers played any role in, let alone “induce[d]” Plaintiff’s termination. Id. Generally speaking, a lower-level employee’s animus can be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker of an adverse action, but that is only the case where the non-decisionmaker “played a meaningful role in the [decision-making] process.” Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 450 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). While Plaintiff, in her Opposition, denies that Defendant Glass was the “sole decision-maker” with respect to her termination, Pl. Mem. 12, the SAC is devoid of any allegations that anyone other than Glass—let alone Rivers or Baptiste specifically—was meaningfully involved in that decision. See SAC ¶ 177 (“Defendant Glass told Plaintiff that he was terminating her employment effective May 20, 2022, based on her work performance.”).3
Based on this, the court concluded that dismissal was warranted, since plaintiff “has not set forth any allegations that her termination was motivated by discrimination.”