In Ross v. Onegevity, Thorne Health Tech Inc., No. 655082/2023, 2025 WL 487499 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Feb. 13, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for age discrimination under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
From the decision:
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) and New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) claims is granted in part and denied in part. To allege employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show (a) she is a member of a protected class; (b) she was qualified for the position; (c) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (d) that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (Hribovsek v United Cerebral Palsy of New York City, 223 AD3d 618 [1st Dept 2024]).
A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination does not need to plead a prima facie case of discrimination but must only give fair notice of the nature of the claim and its grounds (Vig v New York Hairspray Co., L.P., 67 AD3d 140 [1st Dept 2009]). The standard for determining liability for discrimination-based claims under the NYCHRL is to ensure that discrimination plays no role in the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals in the workplace (Williams v New York City Housing Authority, 61 AD3d 62, 76 [1st Dept 2009]). The NYSHRL, which was amended in 2019, mirrors the “play no-role” standard under the NYCHRL (Hosking v Mem’l Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 186 AD3d 58, 64 n.1 [1st Dept 2020]).
Accepting the allegations as true and affording Plaintiff every favorable inference, Plaintiff alleges that she is a sixty-five-year-old female, who was a national leader in brain health, who was ultimately terminated after her responsibilities were largely given to a much younger and less qualified candidate. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Jacobson specifically told Plaintiff’s husband, while discussing Plaintiff’s termination, that he preferred younger candidates who were easier to mold and gave less push back. This is sufficient to state a claim for age discrimination under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL for purposes of a pre-answer motion to dismiss (Vig supra).
The motion as to Onegevity is denied without prejudice. Although Defendants argue that Onegevity and Thorne are separate legal entities, Defendants have not moved via CPLR 3211(a)(1) and have provided no evidence outlining the distinctions between these two entities. Accepting the allegations as true, Plaintiff was employed by both Thorne and Onegevity. Plaintiff’s offer letter was on Thorne’s letter head yet was signed by an officer of Onegevity for a position with Onegevity.
The court concluded that “[o]n this pre-answer motion to dismiss, there are too many issues of fact to find that Plaintiff did not suffer discrimination during her employment with Onegevity.”