In Scribner v. State of New York Office of Court Administration, 6:24-cv-00252 (AMN/TWD), 2025 WL 487428 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s hostile cork environment/constructive discharge claim.
From the decision:
As to Plaintiff’s second claim, Defendants primarily argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege that they created a hostile work environment, let alone that Plaintiff was constructively discharged as a result. Dkt. No. 16-3 at 11–17. In opposition, Plaintiff concedes the absence of discrimination. Dkt. No. 21 at 8; see also Section IV.A, supra.
The Court again agrees with Defendants. Plaintiff’s second claim under Section 1983 is indeed constructive discharge based on a hostile work environment. See Dkt. No. 2 at ¶¶ 29–30 (“Defendants, through their actions, intentionally created a hostile work environment so unbearable that a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position would have felt compelled to resign. [ ] As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct and constructive discharge, Plaintiff suffered [damages.]”). “To establish a hostile work environment claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the workplace is ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create[s] an abusive working environment.’ ” Kunik v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ., 842 F. App’x 668, 671 (2d Cir. 2021) (alterations in original) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 320–21 (2d Cir. 2015)). And “to state a prima facie case of constructive discharge, [Plaintiff] must establish that the constructive discharge ‘occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of [his] membership in [a protected] class.’ ” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996)). The Complaint, however, alleges neither discrimination against Plaintiff nor his membership in a protected class, see generally Dkt. No. 2, and, moreover, Plaintiff concedes that no discrimination took place.
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim for constructive discharge based on hostile work environment.