In Feliz v. Manhattan Restorative Health Sciences, Inc., No. 161563/2021, 2025 WL 574304 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Feb. 21, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims of disability discrimination asserted under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
The court summarized the basic legal framework as follows:
To support a discrimination claim under NYSHRL or NYCHRL, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) [she] is a member of a protected class, (2) [she] was qualified for the position, (3) [she] was subjected to an adverse employment action (under State HRL) or [] was treated differently or worse than other employees (under City HRL), and (4) [] the adverse or different treatment occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination” (Harrington v City of New York, 157 AD3d 582, 584 [1st Dept 2018]). “To establish entitlement to summary judgment in a case alleging discrimination, the defendants must demonstrate either the plaintiff’s inability to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether that reason was pretextual” (Reichman v City of New York, 144 AD3d 781, 782 [2nd Dept 2016]).
After concluding that exhibits that defendants seek to offer did not qualify under the “business records” hearsay exception, the court turned to the merits:
Defendants assert that they “were never informed that Plaintiff suffered from a disability” (NYSCEF Doc Nos 26 ¶ 44 [answer stating “Defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of any alleged disabilities of Plaintiff”], 28 p. 92 [Dr. Canty testifying “we had no awareness that she had any disabilities”]). However, plaintiff alleges that she “had long kept Ms. Garcia informed about her medical impairments, including, inter alia, her pre-diabetes and thyroid issues and severe sleep apnea, [which] necessitated the [bariatric] surgery” (NYSCEF Doc No 1 ¶ 14 [“All of the foregoing impairments, individually and collectively, are [plaintiff’s] disabilities”]), and plaintiff’s coworker Nicole Catania testified that “it was known” that plaintiff had medical issues (NYSCEF Doc No 55, p. 49). This creates an issue of fact as to whether defendants were aware of plaintiff’s disabilities, or whether they should have known of them (Lowman v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 220 AD3d 510, 511 [1st Dept 2023] [summary judgment “properly denied” where contradictory testimony was submitted]). Additionally, as plaintiff notes, employers are bound to provide reasonable accommodations, even in the absence of a specific request (Benitez v City of New York, 193 AD3d 42, 48 [1st Dept 2021]; Phillips v City of New York, 66 AD3d 170, 188-89 n.24 [1st Dept 2009] [“a request for accommodation need not take a specific form, . . . mention the statute[] or the term ‘reasonable accommodation,’ [or] be in writing”]). Plaintiff has thus adequately satisfied the prima facie elements of her claim.
Defendants, however, failed to eliminate all issues of fact as to whether the reason defendants proffered for plaintiff’s termination was pretextual. Besides the business records (which, as discussed supra, are inadmissible), defendants offer the testimony of Dr. Canty, who testified that plaintiff “had job performance issues, but [] she was terminated” because Puranda decided to “consolidate the staff members who were making phone calls and booking patients into a [single] role of patient care coordinator” (NYSCEF Doc No 28, pp. 18-19, 22). This testimony supports defendants’ position that “Plaintiff was terminated as part of a restructure” of MRHS and that “Defendants had, regardless, been looking to terminate Plaintiff for her poor performance and attendance” (NYSCEF Doc No 24).
The court concluded that, “[n]evertheless, this evidence does not demonstrate defendants’ entitlement to judgment as a matter of law as to this issue.”