In Gil-Frederick v. The City of New York, No. 155628/2023, 2025 WL 804677 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Mar. 13, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
From the decision:
Both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL make it an unlawful employment practice to retaliate against a person who has opposed discrimination (Executive Law § 296 [7]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [7]). Under the NYSHRL, the complaint must allege that: (1) Plaintiff was engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer was aware of Plaintiff’s participation, (3) Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, (4) and a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action (Franco v Hyatt Corp., 189 AD3d 569, 571 [1st Dept 2020]). The NYCHRL substitutes adverse action for action that is “reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity” (Franco, 189 AD3d at 571). Under the NYCHRL there is no “type of challenged conduct [that is] categorically rejected as nonactionable” (Williams v New York City Hous. Auth., 61 AD3d 62, 71 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 702 [2009]).
Under these principles, Plaintiff stated a cause of action for retaliation under NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Plaintiff made internal complaints of unlawful discrimination and retaliation with the EEO at least two times and additionally commenced this action (NYSCEF Doc No. 22, Amended Verified Complaint ¶¶ 38, 50, 73). In fact, Plaintiff’s first EEO complaint for retaliation6 was found to be substantiated (id. ¶70). As a result, Plaintiff was continuously denied her requests for reasonable accommodations, sometimes without even engaging in a conversation about the request and forced to take unpaid leave (id. ¶¶ 39, 58, 61, 68). Beyond Plaintiff’s denial, she was either transferred, or received a new supervisor, including at pivotal moments when her accommodation requests were granted by her current supervisor but pending approval of her incoming supervisor, who would then revoke the approval and deny her request (id. ¶¶ 39, 41-43, 76, 80). Plaintiff even claims that her movements and office activities were tracked whenever she left her desk (id. ¶49). Plaintiff was threatened with and consequentially marked absent without leave on numerous occasions (id. ¶¶ 51, 52, 87, 90, 93). While Plaintiff’s supervisor Farley claimed he was “open and available to discuss resolutions” regarding her accommodation requests, at a meeting the next day he clarified that he “would look into ways that would prevent [him] from having to mark [Plaintiff] AWOL while you await a transfer” (id. ¶¶ 53, 54). Plaintiff faced these numerous adverse employment actions occurred mere months if not days after filing both complaints. On these facts and circumstances and without the benefit of discovery it cannot be said that Plaintiff’s complaints were not considered when making the above stated adverse employment decisions (Harrington, 157 AD3d at 586 [“The absence of temporal proximity will not defeat the [retaliation] claim, where, as here, there are other facts supporting causation”]). The Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has not stated a cause of action for retaliation because she was not subject to an adverse employment action and that there is no causal connection is unavailing.
Based on this, the court found that plaintiff stated a cause of action for retaliation under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, and thus denied defendant’s motion to dismiss these claims.