In Knox v. CRC Management Co., LLC, No. 23-121, 2025 WL 1057862 (2d Cir. April 9, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, inter alia, vacated a lower court Order dismissing plaintiff’s claims, on summary judgment, of race- and national origin-based termination.
From the decision:
Knox alleges that Clean Rite’s decision to fire her was motivated at least in part by her race or national origin. To succeed on this theory under § 1981, Title VII, and the New York State Human Rights Law, she must satisfy the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).2 See Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2012); Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010). Meeting her burden under this framework would also satisfy her burden under the more lenient New York City Human Rights Law. See Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 92 A.D.3d 29, 936 N.Y.S.2d 112, 121–22 (1st Dep’t 2011).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Knox must first show that (1) she belonged to a protected class, (2) she was qualified for her job, (3) she was fired, and (4) her firing took place “under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Brown, 673 F.3d at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted). If she meets this prima facie burden, “a presumption of discriminatory intent arises,” and the burden shifts to Clean Rite “to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for” firing her. Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). If it does so, then the burden shifts back to Knox, who must show that Clean Rite’s justification was pretextual or that her firing “was motivated at least in part by [her] membership in a protected class.” Bart v. Golub Corp., 96 F.4th 566, 576 (2d Cir. 2024); see also Bennett, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
Clean Rite argues that summary judgment was warranted because Knox failed to establish a genuine factual dispute as to whether Clean Rite’s reason for firing her was discriminatory. We disagree.
At a minimum, a jury could reasonably infer that Knox’s race or national origin played at least some part, even if not the only part, in her firing. See Bart, 96 F.4th at 576; Bennett, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 121. First, Knox adduced evidence that Ferris had made discriminatory comments to her not long before firing her, telling her that she “looked like Aunt Jemima” and “criticiz[ing] [her] for ‘talking Jamaican’ when [she] got ‘upset.’ ” J. App’x at 238 ¶¶ 15, 16. Second, neither Ferris nor his predecessor, Butler, had taken any action in response to Knox’s complaint about racial harassment by Ashmeade. This is sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
Clean Rite asserts that it fired Knox for a legitimate reason: she took fifteen dollars from its cash register and refused to give it back. But Knox testified at her deposition, and asserted in a sworn declaration, that Clean Rite employees were permitted to take cash from the register to pay their taxi fare so long as they left a receipt, which she did. Knox also said that other employees “engaged in this practice openly as well with no discipline.” J. App’x at 239 ¶ 20. If Clean Rite previously gave its employees permission to take cash from the register for their cab rides, as we must assume to be true for purposes of summary judgment, then it had no reason to demand that Knox return the money. Neither taking the money nor refusing to return it would be a legitimate reason for Knox’s termination.Presented with this evidence of pretext alongside the evidence making up Knox’s prima facie case, including racial comments made by Ferris, who fired her, a reasonable jury could determine that Knox was terminated because of her race or national origin.
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court erroneously found that “a plaintiff’s self-serving statement, without direct or circumstantial evidence to support the charge, is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Knox v. CRC Mgmt. Co., LLC, No. 20-cv-4073, 2023 WL 22605, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, “[a]t summary judgment, [a plaintiff is] entitled to rely on his own testimony to establish his … claim.” Rentas v. Ruffin, 816 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Bellamy v. City of New York, 914 F.3d 727, 746 (2d Cir. 2019) (a “plaintiff’s testimony alone may be independently sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact”). Testimony, of course, includes sworn statements made in depositions or declarations under the penalty of perjury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). “There is nothing in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)] to suggest that nonmovants’ affidavits alone cannot—as a matter of law—suffice to defend against a motion for summary judgment.” Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1998). And “[t]o hold … that the nonmovant’s allegations of fact are (because ‘self-serving’) insufficient to fend off summary judgment would be to thrust the courts—at an inappropriate stage—into an adjudication of the merits.” Id. To the extent the district court’s analysis discounted Knox’s sworn statements for being “self-serving,” doing so was error.
The court further held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create issues of fact on plaintiff’s claims of retaliation, hostile work environment, and disability discrimination.