In Browne v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 2025 WL 1177958 (2d Cir. April 23, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of summary judgment to the defendant on plaintiff’s claim of a race-based hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Browne and Parker alleged that their co-workers and supervisors engaged in discriminatory harassment toward them. They alleged that their co-workers tampered with their timecards, put transfer slips in their mailboxes, gossiped about them, called them names such as “rat,” and circulated derogatory poems about them in the workplace. Parker also alleged that co-workers stalked her, and Browne alleged that co-workers cut the valve stem on his car. Browne and Parker further alleged that their supervisors assigned them to less desirable posts and disregarded their staffing requests.
We agree with the district court, however, that there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that these acts of harassment were directed at Browne and Parker because of their race. None of the alleged harassment referred to either plaintiff’s race. Instead, the only evidence referencing any reason for the alleged abuse, including the plaintiffs’ own testimony, tended to indicate that Browne and Parker were harassed because they were perceived to be disloyal. Parker stated that other officers believed she was a “rat” because she had testified on behalf of an inmate in a disciplinary hearing. As a result, those officers thought that she did not “stick up for the blues.” J. App’x 362. Browne stated that other officers regarded him as a “scumbag” because he had testified against a fellow corrections officer at another institution where he had worked. See id. at 98-99, 691.
Browne and Parker assert that the poems were “racially offensive.” Appellant’s Br. 6. But the poems make no reference to race and instead describe an officer who served as an informant for the Office of Special Investigations. See J. App’x 743-45. Taken together, the evidence offers nothing to suggest that the treatment of Browne and Parker was based on their race. The evidence is consistent with the theory that they experienced “workplace bullying completely detached from any discriminatory motive.” Vito v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 403 F. App’x 593, 596 (2d Cir. 2010).
Nor could a reasonable jury infer that the supervisors discriminated against Browne and Parker because of their race. Browne and Parker argue that they were assigned to “less desirable” posts more often than white officers. Appellant’s Br. 9. However, the record indicates that (1) “[t]here are no inferior posts,” (2) other officers were assigned to the posts that were subjectively considered “less desirable” at least as much as Browne and Parker, and (3) Browne and Parker were assigned to posts that were consistent with their job responsibilities. J. App’x 754-59. Browne and Parker additionally argue that they did not receive the staffing assignments they requested, see Appellant’s Br. 34, but they identify no evidence to support the assertion that the posts they requested were assigned to white officers. Accordingly, there is no basis in the record to conclude that staffing decisions were made in a racially discriminatory manner.
This decision, like many, illustrates that a viable hostile work environment claim requires not only evidence of “hostility”, but also that the “hostility” is “because of” one’s membership in a protected class.