In Qamar v. Board of Trustees of Governors State University, 2025 WL 1309843 (N.D.Ill. May 6, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s national origin-based hostile work environment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
As previewed, to bring this cause of action, the plaintiff must allege that they were harassed based on a protected characteristic, the harassment was severe or pervasive, it created a “hostile or abusive situation,” and the employer could be liable. Dodgen, 2022 WL 4607926, at *4. “[C]ourts consider the totality of the circumstance” when determining whether the plaintiff has pled severe or pervasive conduct. Id. Relevant factors include: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
At the motion to dismiss stage, it is premature to conclude “just how abusive” the work environment was; but the plaintiff must allege enough to show it “could plausibly be abusive.” Huri v. Off. of the Chief Judge of the Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., 804 F.3d 826, 834 (7th Cir. 2015). For example, in Huri, a national origin and religious discrimination case, the Seventh Circuit concluded the plaintiff’s allegations of a hostile work environment were sufficient where she alleged that she was subjected to “screaming, prayer circles, social shunning, implicit criticism of non-Christians, and uniquely bad treatment.” Id. In the national origin discrimination context, courts have found allegations sufficient where supervisors repeatedly criticized the plaintiff’s English skills, berated her in front of other employees, required the plaintiff’s questions be written in English, and screamed at the plaintiff for mistakes other employees also made. Chillmon v. Vill. of Evergreen Park Illinois, 692 F. Supp. 3d 834, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2023).
In his complaint, Qamar alleges that “GSU created a hostile work environment … by treating him differently from other employees because of his national origin from Pakistan.” [Dkt. 1, ¶ 30.] Specifically, GSU (1) sent Qamar over 140 emails at odd hours over a ten-day period; (2) removed him as search committee chair; and (3) denied him the opportunity for outside employment. [Dkt. 4 ¶¶ 2–3.]8
While Qamar alleges this is severe or pervasive conduct, the test has both subjective and objective components. Little, 2019 WL 1505408, at *4. Looking at the relevant factors, Qamar does not allege any of the conduct was threatening; he does not allege that it was humiliating;9 other than the emails, Qamar does not allege any conduct that was pervasive or occurred over a long period of time. For example, while removal from the chair position supports Qamar’s other Title VII claims, such as his retaliation claim (Claim II), it does not support a hostile work environment claim. The same goes for Qamar’s claim that he was denied the opportunity to engage in outside work. This single occurrence does not allow for the plausible inference that Qamar suffered from a hostile work environment. Single occurrences may support a hostile work environment claim, but only where they are severe. Moses v. Sloan Valve Co., 2017 WL 3838040, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2017). From an objective standpoint, and given the lack of detail in Qamar’s complaint, removal from his chair position and denial of the opportunity to engage in outside work are not sufficiently severe to support a hostile work environment claim.
Turning to Qamar’s allegation about emails, receiving over 140 emails over a ten-day period—or an average of 14 emails per day—is not objectively a large number. Even if that pattern continued for a longer period of time, as Qamar claims in his opposition brief [dkt. 22 at 6], that conduct alone does not plausibly suggest severe or pervasive harassment on the basis of Qamar’s national origin. There are no facts in Qamar’s complaint about how the content of the emails was harassing, nor has he alleged how the emails were tied to his national origin. Huri, 804 F.3d at 834 (explaining that the plaintiff must allege that “the harassment was based on h[is] national origin”).
The court concluded that while “[t]he calculus could be different if Qamar alleged that the emails berated him due to his Pakistani origin, used epithets, or something similar … the most he alleges is that he received the emails at odd hours with the intent of harassing him” and that “[a]t bottom, there is no support from Qamar’s well-pled allegations that Defendants subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his national origin.”