In Lobosco v. City of New York, No. 152196/2024, 2025 WL 1446815 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County May 20, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s discrimination and hostile work environment claims asserted under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
In her complaint, plaintiff “details a pervasive pattern of gender-based disparate treatment including disproportionate workloads, a facially gendered policy prohibiting women from working with doors closed, sexually suggestive remarks, and differential overtime and assignment practices,” prompting her to file an internal complaint.
From the decision:
The NYCHRL and NYSHRL–as amended in 2019–require only that discriminatory conduct not amount to mere “petty slights or trivial inconveniences” (Alshami v. City Univ. of N.Y., 203 AD3d 592 [1st Dept 2022]; Fruchtman v. City of New York, 129 AD3d 500 [1st Dept 2015]).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations surpass that standard. Indeed, Plaintiff identifies a facially discriminatory “open door” policy targeting female officers, remarks explicitly barring her from being alone with male colleagues to avoid “funny business,” and a history of discriminatory overtime and assignment practices which cost her significant income–allegedly over $11,000 annually compared to male comparators. In Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 AD3d 62 (1st Dept 2009), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that such gender-based differential treatment and derogatory comments could support a claim under the NYCHRL, especially where they impact compensation, assignments, and promotional opportunities.
Moreover, the complaint plausibly alleges both disparate treatment and a hostile work environment by showing that performance evaluations and monitoring varied according to protected characteristics, giving rise to a prima facie inference of discriminatory animus. Whether each proposed comparator is precisely analogous is an issue for discovery, not for decision on a motion to dismiss.
The court further declined to strike plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages at this time, noting the NYCHRL’s “explicit statutory authority rebutting the common law presumption against municipal punitive liability.”