In Flanagan et al v. Girl Scouts of Suffolk County, Inc. et al, 23-7900-cv, 2025 WL 1501751 (2d Cir. May 27, 2025), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff plausibly alleged race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and vacated a lower court order holding otherwise.
After summarizing the black-letter law, the court proceeded to apply it to the facts. As to plaintiff’s claim under § 1981, the court explained:
Here the amended complaint plausibly alleges, when all the facts are construed most favorably to Grant, that Grant was targeted in such a way that raises an inference of racial animus. For instance, the amended complaint alleges that, during her first week of employment with GSSC, Mastrota stated that Grant “would be one of the first people fired and that firing would occur within three to four months.” Moreover, “[w]ithout any knowledge of [Grant’s] activities,” Mastrota allegedly stated that he was “not busy enough,” “unqualified,” and “overpaid.” Id. at 33, 35–36; see Stratton v. Dep’t for the Aging for City of New York, 132 F.3d 869, 879 n.6 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Actions taken by an employer that disadvantage an employee for no logical reason constitute strong evidence of an intent to discriminate.”). Plaintiffs allege that this behavior amounted to “labeling Mr. Grant incompetent, expendable[,] and the recipient of nepotism.” Joint App’x at 34. In addition, as among GSSC’s directors, Grant received the highest initial salary reduction of 40%, and generally, employees of color received salary reductions of at least 20% while the lowest reduction rate of 10% was received by a Caucasian employee. See Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[a] plaintiff may support an inference of race discrimination by demonstrating that similarly situated employees of a different race were treated more favorably”).
Furthermore, according to the amended complaint, Mastrota also claimed to have demoted Grant because he did not have a supervisee. However, Mastrota removed his supervisee, while, at the same time, she allowed one of Grant’s Caucasian co-workers, who also lacked a supervisee, to maintain her supervisory title and pay. Mastrota also allegedly reduced the pay of co-workers who defended Grant and worked with Brown to falsify a technology problem, for which they attempted to blame Grant. Moreover, Mastrota also allegedly singled out Grant at meetings for “not doing his job.” Joint App’x at 36. Taken collectively, these allegations are sufficient to plausibly support an inference of unlawful racial discrimination. See Vega, 801 F.3d at 87 (explaining that, at the motion to dismiss stage, “the question is not whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail, but whether the well-pleaded factual allegations plausibly give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, i.e., whether plaintiffs allege enough to ‘nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’ ” (alteration adopted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))); Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The facts required by Iqbal to be alleged in the complaint … need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.”).
To the extent that Defendants attempt to identify legitimate reasons for Mastrota’s actions or argue that Mastrota’s motivation for treating Grant differently was perceived nepotism, we emphasize that, at the motion to dismiss stage, “we are primarily concerned with whether there is minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent, and not with questions as to which the defendants bear the burden of production, such as whether there existed non-pretextual, nondiscriminatory explanations for the defendants’ employment decisions.” Moreover, although Defendants suggest that the potential non-discriminatory motivations for the adverse actions make it impossible to plausibly allege that discrimination was the “but-for” cause of such actions, we disagree. “[E]ven under the more stringent ‘but-for’ standard, a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision. So long as the plaintiff’s [race] was one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough to trigger the law.” As explained above, the amended complaint alleges, among other things, that Grant was demoted for reasons unrelated to his performance and was treated differently than other directors in terms of his salary reduction and differently than a Caucasian manager in terms of his title. These allegations plausibly plead that unlawful discrimination was at least “one but-for cause” of the adverse employment actions.
[Citations and internal quotation marks omitted]
As to state law, the court held that because plaintiff plausibly alleges a race discrimination claim under § 1981, “his NYSHRL claim must a fortiori also pass muster” under the “more liberal pleading standard” applicable to claims brought under that statute.