Failure to Accommodate Disability Claim Against City of Yonkers Survives Summary Judgment

In Guarniero v City of Yonkers, No. 2023-11290, 58292/21, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 04554, 2025 WL 2233306 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., Aug. 06, 2025), the New York Appellate Division, Second Department held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of failure to accommodate his disability under the New York State Human Rights Law.

From the decision:

NYSHRL prohibits discrimination in employment based on, among other grounds, disability (see Executive Law § 296[a]; Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824, 833–834, 988 N.Y.S.2d 86, 11 N.E.3d 159; Alvarez v. New York City Tr. Auth., 230 A.D.3d 541, 542, 215 N.Y.S.3d 522). Under NYSHRL, “if a reasonable accommodation would permit the employee to perform the essential functions of the employee’s position, the employee has a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the statute, and the employer cannot disadvantage the employee based on that disability” (Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d at 834, 988 N.Y.S.2d 86, 11 N.E.3d 159; Alvarez v. New York City Tr. Auth., 230 A.D.3d at 542, 215 N.Y.S.3d 522 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Reasonable accommodations include “reassignment to an available position” (9 NYCRR 466.11[a][2]). An employer normally cannot obtain summary judgment on an employment discrimination claim based on disability pursuant to NYSHRL “unless the record demonstrates that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the employer duly considered the requested accommodation,” and the employer cannot present such a record “if the employer has not engaged in interactions with the employee revealing at least some deliberation upon the viability of the employee’s request” (Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d at 837, 988 N.Y.S.2d 86, 11 N.E.3d 159; Cohen v. State of New York, 129 A.D.3d 897, 899, 10 N.Y.S.3d 628 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Consequently, contrary to the City’s contention, to prevail on a summary judgment motion with respect to a claim pursuant to NYSHRL, the employer must show that it engaged in a good-faith interactive process that assessed the needs of the disabled individual and the reasonableness of the accommodation requested (see Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d at 837, 988 N.Y.S.2d 86, 11 N.E.3d 159). “[An] employer has a duty to move forward to consider accommodation once the need for accommodation is known or requested” (9 NYCRR 466.11[j][4]).

Here, the City failed to establish, prima facie, that it engaged in a good-faith interactive process that assessed the needs of the plaintiff and the reasonableness of his requested accommodation (see Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d at 837–838, 988 N.Y.S.2d 86, 11 N.E.3d 159). Specifically, the City relied on, inter alia, the deposition testimony and affidavit of the DPW’s Commissioner, who denied the plaintiff’s request for an accommodation. There is no evidence in the record that the Commissioner was aware of the plaintiff’s condition when he made his determination or that the Commissioner considered the accommodation that the plaintiff was requesting to be reassigned to the position of a custodian at one of the City’s senior citizens centers. The Commissioner testified that he had no memory of meeting with the plaintiff to discuss his request for an accommodation. The Commissioner also testified that he did not know that the plaintiff’s request for an accommodation concerned psoriatic arthritis, did not know the limitations typically associated with that condition, and did not know the limitations that the condition allegedly caused the plaintiff to suffer. The Commissioner further testified that he did not speak with the plaintiff’s physician and did not recall reviewing any of the information that the physician provided to the City.

Based on this, the court concluded that the City’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint should have been denied without regard to the sufficiency of plaintiff’s opposition papers.

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