In D’Agostino v. Detar, No. 952267/2023, 2025 WL 2896133 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Oct. 09, 2025), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged sexual harassment under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
From the decision:
As it relates to Juilliard, Plaintiff’s claims against Juilliard pursuant to NYSHRL are predicated on Executive Law § 296. Sex was added as a protected class to educational discrimination under NYSHRL in 2003. (see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(4) (effective Nov. 16, 2002, to Jan. 15, 2003)). However, as Plaintiff was both employed as a teaching fellow and a student, his claims are not time-barred as his status as employee at the time falls squarely within NYSHRL. As such, Plaintiff’s claims do not require retroactive application and as such survive Defendants motion to dismiss.
Turning to Plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim, Juilliard moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action under the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq., arguing that the complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating that Plaintiff was treated “less well” because of his gender. Juilliard asserts that the allegations concern isolated incidents by two now-deceased faculty members, occurring off campus more than forty years ago, and do not plausibly support a claim of institutional discrimination
In opposition, Plaintiff contends that the complaint adequately states a claim under the NYCHRL. Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to unwanted sexual conduct by Juilliard faculty members de Tar and Raver, that Juilliard knew or should have known of their history of inappropriate sexual misconduct toward students, and that Juilliard failed to take corrective measures. Plaintiff further points to his report of abuse to another faculty member, who allegedly confirmed awareness of misconduct by both de Tar and Raver, as demonstrating institutional knowledge and a hostile educational environment.The NYCHRL must be construed independently from and more liberally than its state and federal counterparts (Williams v New York City Hous. Auth., 61 AD3d 62, 83 [1st Dept 2009]). A plaintiff need only show that he was treated “less well” because of his gender (Hernandez v Kaisman, 103 AD3d 106, 114 [1st Dept 2012]). At the pleading stage, Plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference, and the Court’s role is to determine whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory.
Applying these standards, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim under the NYCHRL. The complaint sets forth that Plaintiff was subjected to repeated unwanted sexual conduct by faculty members, that Juilliard knew or should have known of these individuals’ misconduct, and that Juilliard failed to act. Accepting these allegations as true, they state a claim that Plaintiff was treated less well because of his gender.
Having concluded that plaintiff sufficiently alleged gender discrimination, the court concluded that “whether Plaintiff can ultimately establish these allegations is a matter for discovery and not for determination on a motion to dismiss.”