In Pizarro v. Quezada et al, No. 24-2422, 2025 WL 2865251 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 2025) (Summary Order), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, inter alia, affirmed a lower court order denying defendants’ motion seeking remittitur of the jury’s award of $1.75 million in compensatory (emotional distress) damages.
In sum, plaintiff alleged that, over the courts of several years, she suffered sexual harassment, where the alleged harasser, Quezada, “would grope her three times per month, tell sexually explicit stories in front of her, and expose his genitals to her; and that he masturbated in front of her on one occasion” and attempted to rape her.
The court explained:
Upon reviewing comparable cases, we hold that Pizarro’s awards do not “deviate[ ] materially” from comparable compensatory damages awards for emotional distress. To be sure, Pizarro’s compensatory damages awards outstrip awards in many other cases involving workplace sexual harassment, even cases involving physical touching. See, e.g., Caravantes, 2012 WL 3631276, at *24 (awarding $150,000 for unwanted sexual touching and coerced sex); Bouveng v. NYG Cap. LLC, 175 F. Supp. 3d 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (remitting $500,000 award to $150,000 in case involving quid pro quo sexual harassment and retaliation). However, Pizarro’s testimony regarding Quezada’s attempt to forcibly rape her, which we must assume the jury credited in reaching its verdict, see DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2005), renders the jury’s award more comparable to cases directly involving sexual assault claims, which have tended to result in higher awards. See, e.g., Ortiz v. New York City Hous. Auth., 22 F. Supp. 2d 15, 38-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d 198 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding jury award of $3 million—which is equivalent to approximately $5.6 million in October 2023 when Plaintiff Pizzaro received her jury verdict—for a negligence claim against landlord after plaintiff was raped at gunpoint in stairwell of building); Doe v. HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud, Saudi Oger Ltd., No. 13-cv-571, 2017 WL 4541426, at *1, *4–*6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2017) (judge awarding $1.25 million for rape and assault, approximately $1.6 million in October 2023 dollars); Breest v. Haggis, No. 161137/2017, 2023 WL 374404, at *3–*4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Jan. 24, 2023) (upholding jury award of $7.5 million for defendant’s rape and sexual assault of plaintiff, approximately $7.75 million in October 2023 dollars); Noonan v. Becker, No. 14-cv-4084, 2018 WL 1738746, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2088279 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2018) (judge awarding $1 million for § 1983 claims after law enforcement officer raped plaintiff, approximately $1.2 million in October 2023 dollars). We cannot say that Pizarro’s awards “deviate[ ] materially” from the compensatory damages for emotional distress awarded in these cases.
Defendants argue primarily that Pizarro’s “failure to proffer any medical or expert testimony, or any medical records related to her alleged psychiatric treatment” mandates that the award be remitted. See Appellant’s Br. at 27–28. True, corroborating medical or expert evidence of a plaintiff’s emotional distress is often introduced to substantiate a plaintiff’s account of her own distress, and district courts often point to the presence of such evidence to shore up the reasonableness of a jury award or a court’s own recommended award. See, e.g., Ortiz, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 38; Marchisotto v. City of New York, No. 05-cv-2699, 2007 WL 1098678, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2007). But corroborating expert testimony or medical evidence of a plaintiff’s distress is not required to sustain an award of emotional distress damages, see, e.g. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56, 77 (2d Cir. 2004) (sustaining an award for “subjective distress” where plaintiffs “offered no proof other than testimony establishing shock, nightmares, sleeplessness, humiliation”), vacated on other grounds sub nom., KAPL, Inc. v. Meacham, 544 U.S. 957 (2005); Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (sustaining an award where the only evidence of harm was the plaintiff’s own “testimony of his humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of self-confidence, as well as testimony relating to his sleeplessness, headaches, stomach pains, and burning in his eyes from the use of mace in the [relevant] attack”).
Pizarro submitted evidence that she attempted suicide, received psychiatric treatment for depression, suffered from PTSD, and had recurring nightmares. In light of these manifestations of severe emotional distress, which we must assume the jury credited, DiBella, 403 F.3d at 110, we cannot say that the jury’s $1.725 million compensatory damages award was excessive.
The court further upheld the district court’s rejection of the jury’s $1 million punitive damages award.