In Koenig v. Celitech, Inc. et al, 26-cv-90, 2026 WL 1088617 (E.D.N.Y. April 22, 2026), the court applied well-settled employment discrimination law, concluding that although plaintiff “was the only female executive working for defendants” it did not follow “that her termination was a result of gender discrimination,” since “the fact that an employee is the only member of a protected class that works for an employer does not transmogrify every adverse management decision into actionable discrimination.”
From the decision:
To show that her termination was discriminatory, plaintiff focuses heavily on the fact that she was the only female executive at Celitech. But it is well settled that sole membership in a protected class does not make every disagreeable employment decision an act of discrimination. See Mitchell v. Planned Parenthood of Greater N.Y., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 3d 68, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (The fact that plaintiff “was the first Black … man on [defendant’s] executive-leadership team … by itself, does not indicate that any actions were motivated by [discrimination]”); Pattanayak v. Mastercard Inc., No. 22-1411, 2023 WL 2358826, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 6, 2023) (summary order) (“the fact that [plaintiff] was the only employee of a protected class in a department does not, standing alone, give rise to an inference of discriminatory motive.”).
Plaintiff’s better argument is that Fares’ negative reaction to her taking leave suggests that he harbored some discriminatory animus, because her male colleagues took leave regularly without such pushback. The problem is that Fares’ negative reaction is not (and could not be) the impetus for her discrimination claim, because “the NYCHRL is not a ‘general civility code.’ ” Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013). If it were plaintiff’s theory that she was terminated because she took leave, she might have a viable claim based on her allegations that her male colleagues frequently took leave without issue.
That is not what plaintiff alleges, however. Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated because she complained about being “bombarded” with work requests while she was on leave. But firing an employee for trying to set work-life boundaries is just “poor management[,] not discrimination.”
Accordingly, it granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims.
The court likewise granted defendants’ hostile work environment claims, finding that the alleged “verbal abuse” was insufficient. Notably, plaintiff did not describe what was actually said, and “[f]or these kinds of claims, the content of the verbal abuse is the prototypical factual allegation that turns a conclusory assertion to a plausible claim for relief.”