In ANGELA MARIE KING, Plaintiff, v. KOCH AG & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant., No. CV 25-1017-KHV, 2026 WL 1066935 (D. Kan. Apr. 20, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on her hostile work environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision.
Count One asserts that in violation of Title VII …, defendant subjected plaintiff to unlawful sexual harassment which created a hostile work environment. Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment because the behavior she complains of (1) is not severe or pervasive and (2) is not related to her sex. Plaintiff responded that she experienced years of dismissive, condescending, bullying and chauvinistic behavior from Lane which occurred nearly daily and interfered with her ability to perform her job, and that Tredway took no action to cease Lane’s behavior and instead began treating plaintiff poorly. Plaintiff further responds that Lane did not exhibit these behaviors toward male employees.
To establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment, plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a member of a protected group, (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was based on the protected group and (4) the harassment was so severe or pervasive that it altered a term, condition or privilege of employment. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 Fed. App’x. 707, 721 (10th Cir. 2008). A hostile work environment claim is “composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002). “An employer creates a hostile work environment when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Iweha v. State of Kan., 121 F.4th 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2024). Plaintiff must prove that her work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile. Throupe v. Univ. of Denver, 988 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 2021). To make this determination, the Court looks at the totality of the circumstances and considers “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
Whether a hostile work environment exists “is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test.” Id. at 22. Rather, it “depends not only on the number of incidents, but also on the severity of the incidents.” Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1143 (10th Cir. 2008). Whether a work environment is hostile is disjunctive—pervasiveness and severity are independent and equal grounds on which plaintiff can support her hostile work environment claim. Lounds v. Lincare, Inc., 812 F.3d 1208, 1222 (10th Cir. 2015).
Viewing it in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record reflects that Lane (1) repeatedly questioned plaintiff’s involvement in certain meetings and initiatives, (2) questioned plaintiff’s expertise in front of other KAES employees, (3) stated to other KAES employees that he “spoke for” plaintiff, (4) refused to allocate support from his subordinates to assist with plaintiff’s initiatives, (5) credited himself for plaintiff’s work product to other KAES employees, (6) criticized plaintiff’s input and ideas directly to her and in front of other KAES employees, (7) excluded plaintiff from key meetings, (8) mischaracterized data issues as being the fault of plaintiff, (9) became aggressive in tone and posture toward plaintiff, (10) expressed frustration that plaintiff had not obtained Lane’s approval on her work product and (11) generally undermined plaintiff’s work. The record reflects that Tredway (1) took zero action to cease Lane’s behavior and, instead, (2) began treating plaintiff poorly, (3) threatening her salary, (4) threatening her employment, (5) holding her accountable for the discriminatory and chauvinistic behaviors of the Dodge City leadership who consciously chose not to follow her accurate forecasting and (6) decreased plaintiff’s I-Comp.
None of Lane or Tredway’s actions are sufficiently severe to support a claim for hostile work environment. See Morris v. City of Colo. Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 667 (10th Cir. 2012) (conduct must be “especially egregious or extreme” to be severe enough to survive summary judgment). A genuine issue of material fact exists, however, as to whether the conduct was pervasive. Plaintiff asserts that she experienced Lane’s bullying nearly every day for years.
The record reflects a genuine issue of material fact whether Lane’s behavior was because of plaintiff’s sex. Rebecca Fox, who worked closely with plaintiff and Lane, observed Lane exhibit “dismissive, condescending, and bullying demeanor toward King and other female KAES employees, particularly when female employees spoke up or presented challenges to Lane’s ideas,” and she “did not observe Lane exhibit this type of behavior toward other male employees, regardless of their level of leadership.” A reasonable jury could view Lane’s behavior as the embodiment of chauvinistic behavior that women often face in the workplace. Genuine issues of material fact exist whether Lane’s treatment of plaintiff created a hostile work environment and whether Tredway—knowing as much—failed to make it stop.
Accordingly, held the court, summary judgment was improper.