In Koudoukara v. Embassy of Mali, No. CV 24-1900 (SLS), 2026 WL 1587293 (D.D.C. June 3, 2026), the court , inter alia, granted plaintiff’s motion for default judgment on plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Ms. Koudoukara brings claims for sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and quid-pro-quo sexual harassment against the Embassy. Mot. 6–14. Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person “based on sex.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986). And “[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.” Id. at 64. So “[t]wo types of sexual harassment are actionable under Title VII: quid pro quo and hostile work environment.” Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Quid pro quo is “explicit”—it “occurs when an employer alters, or threatens to alter, an employee’s job conditions as a result of the employee’s refusal to submit to sexual demands.” Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Gary v. WMATA, No. 90-3076, 1992 WL 714990, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1992). Meanwhile, a hostile work environment is “constructive”—it is established “when harassing conduct at work is sufficiently pervasive so as to create an abusive working environment.” Curry, 195 F.3d at 659; Gary, 1992 WL 714990, at *3. Importantly, “these labels” merely describe “varying workplace conditions that violate Title VII’s basic prohibition on sex discrimination in terms or conditions of employment.” Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 698 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1998)). Thus, although Ms. Koudoukara brings her quid-pro-quo sexual harassment, sexual harassment, and sex discrimination claims as separate counts, the Court considers them together as a part of her “cause of action for discrimination on the basis of sex[.]” Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, 876 F. Supp. 2d 176, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (using this approach).
Here, Ms. Koudoukara has met her burden of establishing discrimination based on quid-pro-quo sexual harassment. Her claims are governed by the familiar burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To make out a prima facie case, she must show (1) “that she was a member of a protected class,” (2) “that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors,” (3) “that the harassment complained of was based on sex,” (4) “that the employee’s submission to the unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits or that the employee’s refusal to submit to the supervisor’s sexual demands resulted in an adverse job consequence,” and (5) “that respondeat superior liability exists.” Norris v. WMATA, 342 F. Supp. 3d 97, 121 (D.D.C. 2018).
Ms. Koudoukara has done just that. She has declared under penalty of perjury (1) that she is a female previously employed by the Embassy, (2) that her supervisor Ambassador Berthe repeatedly requested sexual favors from her, (3) that such sexual favors were sought from female employees but not male employees, and (4) that she was terminated due to her refusal to have sex with the Ambassador. Koudoukara Aff. ¶¶ 2–6, 8–12. This is certainly enough to demonstrate the first four prongs of a prima facie claim. See Norris, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 121. Ms. Koudoukara further declared that she reported the Ambassador’s concerning behavior to the Embassy’s human resources, who took no action. Koudoukara Aff. ¶¶ 7, 10. And such “attempts to complain about her supervisor’s harassing behavior, which were ignored,” is more than enough to show respondeat superior liability for sexual harassment. Chadwick v. District of Columbia, 56 F. Supp. 2d 69, 71 (D.D.C. 1999). Thus, Ms. Koudoukara has made out a prima facie claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment.
Normally, “[i]f a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, ‘[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [adverse employment action].” Stanford v. Howard Univ., No. 23-cv-3041, 2025 WL 3062907, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 2025) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). But here, the Embassy defaulted and thus, failed to articulate any nondiscriminatory reason. See Guerra v. Bros. Builders, LLC, No. 23-cv-1291, 2025 WL 2709631, at *1 (D.D.C. Sep. 23, 2025).
Accordingly, the court held that the motion would be granted.