In Joseph v. Thomas-Grace Constr. Inc., No. 25-2568, 2026 WL 2131745 (8th Cir. July 24, 2026), the court, inter alia, affirmed the district court’s award of summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim of sex-based discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Here, Joseph does not provide any direct evidence of sex discrimination. While she frequently argues that her supervisors “discounted [her] because [she] was a female” and treated her differently because of her sex, she does not cite any evidence for this other than her own uncorroborated, conclusory deposition testimony. Thus, her “allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond [her] own conclusions,” do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. Jones, 77 F.4th at 663 (citation omitted).
Joseph also fails to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework, as she does not provide any “facts that give rise to an inference of sex discrimination.” McGinnis, 496 F.3d at 874. As the district court found, “the record is devoid of evidence tying TGC’s decisions to any form of discriminatory animus,” and “there are no documents supporting Joseph’s claim that TGC was motivated by unlawful discrimination.” This conclusion is amply supported by the record, given that Joseph’s own supporting witness, Michael Brocksen, “did not notice any sort of inappropriate behavior or attitude from [Hansen],” nor did he report any inappropriate behavior by Cikotte; that Joseph’s emails regarding Cikotte on the day he allegedly mistreated her did not mention sex discrimination; and that Joseph herself did not bring up sex discrimination in her interview with TGC during its investigation of her complaint.
Joseph does not cite any evidence to refute the district court’s finding—only her own conclusory allegations about TGC. While she frequently refers to her deposition statements and her email to Malloy complaining that “[t]he men are always right in the eyes of the company …. [and] are treated as more valuable,” these self-serving statements do not create a genuine factual dispute as to whether discrimination occurred. See Jones, 77 F.4th at 663; Palesch v. Mo. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 233 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff’s “general allegations and opinion testimony [of sex discrimination did] not suffice” because “she failed to produce any evidence … other than her own unsubstantiated opinion testimony”).
Joseph also contends that her first supervisor, Raney, discriminated against her based on sex as soon as she began working at TGC. But this contention is explicitly contradicted by her later communications to TGC regarding Raney, in which she admitted that she had “misunderstandings … about [him],” “fe[lt] embarrassed and ashamed at [her] reaction to [him],” and “was wrong.”Lastly, Joseph points out that she was “the only female” who was asked to transfer job sites and that neither Cikotte or Hansen were asked to transfer despite Joseph’s allegations against them. To sustain a discrimination claim by showing disparate treatment, Joseph must show that she was “treated differently from similarly situated males” and “that [she] and male co-workers were ‘involved in … similar conduct and [were] disciplined in different ways.’ ” Tenge, 446 F.3d at 910 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). However, Joseph’s disparate treatment argument fails out of the gate because she does not provide any explanation for how Cikotte and Hansen were “similarly situated” to her or how they were “involved in … similar conduct.” Id. (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the court concluded that since plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of discrimination, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on her discrimination claims.