In C. N. v. Sigma Delta Tau Soc’y, No. 2025–13523, 2026 WL 2855525 (N.Y. App. Div. Sept. 23, 2026), the court addressed an issue of first impression, namely,
whether the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) (9 USC §§ 401, 402) can serve to prevent arbitration, notwithstanding an arbitration clause in a contract between the parties, of an action sounding in negligence against a party that did not commit the alleged sexual assault.
The court held that the answer to this question is “yes,” under the circumstances presented here.
The court summarized the facts as follows:
[P]laintiff attended SUNY Cortland and was a member of the sorority, which was and remains incorporated in the state of Indiana. On September 14, 2023, a fraternity chapter, Pi Kappa Phi (hereinafter the fraternity), allegedly held a mixer event off campus in Cortland. According to the complaint, the plaintiff, as a member of the sorority, was “expected and obligated by [the] sorority to attend the mandatory mixer event to be hosted by the fraternity.” The fraternity purportedly provided alcohol and other intoxicating substances to the attendees at the mixer event, which caused the plaintiff to become impaired. Allegedly, while attending the mixer event, the plaintiff met a member of the fraternity (hereinafter the alleged abuser) who took the plaintiff to a nearby premises where he sexually assaulted her.
Plaintiff commenced this action against the sorority to recover damages for personal injuries, alleging that the sorority was “negligent, wanton, reckless and careless in requiring all members including [the] plaintiff, to attend [the] fraternity mixer.” The complaint further alleged that the fraternity had been removed from the SUNY Cortland campus and was unaffiliated with the fraternity’s national organization due to “previous inappropriate and dangerous conduct,” of which the sorority knew or should have known.
In assessing the EFAA issue, the court explained:
Here, as a threshold matter, the plaintiff sufficiently alleged conduct that constitutes a “sexual assault dispute” under the EFAA insofar as it “involv[es] a nonconsensual sexual act” (9 USC § 401[3] ). According to the complaint, the plaintiff met the alleged abuser, a member of the fraternity, at the fraternity mixer event, which the sorority “expected and obligated” the plaintiff to attend. The fraternity purportedly had been removed from the SUNY Cortland campus and was unaffiliated with the fraternity’s national organization due to previous inappropriate and dangerous conduct. The complaint further alleged that, after the plaintiff became impaired and entered a disabled condition from intoxicating substances provided to attendees at the event, the alleged abuser took the plaintiff to a neighboring premises, where he sexually assaulted her. This is sufficient to establish that the dispute “involved” a nonconsensual sexual act.2 Contrary to the sorority’s contentions, “the EFAA requires only that the dispute itself involve sexual assault or contact—not that the defendant caused or engaged in the sex act” (Polen v. API Group Life Safety USA, LLC, 2025 WL 3251349, *3, 2025 U.S. Dist LEXIS 229376, *9 [emphasis omitted] ).
Since the plaintiff has alleged conduct constituting a sexual assault dispute, the next inquiry is whether the action “relates” to that dispute. The EFAA applies to the negligence cause of action here because, based on the allegations of sexual assault in the complaint, the action specifically “relates to the sexual assault dispute” (9 USC § 402[a] ). The cause of action alleged that the sorority negligently failed to provide and maintain adequate supervision over its members while they attended the mixer event and that the plaintiff was sexually assaulted as a result of the sorority’s failure to supervise. It was, according to the plaintiff, the sorority’s tortious failure to act that brought about the sexual assault. There is thus a logical nexus between the action brought against the sorority and the sexual assault. Since the complaint against the sorority plainly included an allegation of a “sexual assault dispute” (id. § 401[3] ), and the action is “a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute” (id. § 402[a] ), the EFAA applies to the instant matter and serves to render unenforceable the arbitration agreement (see Bulic v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 2025 WL 1783865, 2025 U.S. Dist LEXIS 122495; Delo v Paul Taylor Dance Found., Inc., 685 F Supp 3d 173).
In sum, although the sorority contends that the plaintiff’s cause of action sounds in negligence as opposed to sexual assault, that distinction is immaterial here. The negligence cause of action is “related” to the sexual assault dispute alleged in the complaint, which is all that is required under the EFAA (see 9 USC § 402[a] ). While the sorority is a third party that was not directly involved in the sexual assault, the negligence claim is nonetheless “related” to the sexual assault dispute inasmuch as the plaintiff contends that the sorority placed her in a dangerous circumstance that led to the sexual assault. There is a clear logical nexus between the cause of action alleged in the complaint and the alleged sexual assault, which places this matter squarely within the ambit of the EFAA.
Accordingly, court reversed the lower court’s decision, and denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503(a) and to stay the action.