In Elshabrowy v. Ali Awad Law, P.C. et al, No. 26-CV-50 (HG)(SDE), 2026 WL 2880879 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2026), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff sufficiently Alleged sexual harassment under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws and, therefore, has alleged a “sexual harassment dispute” within the scope of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (“EFAA”).
From the decision:
The next question is whether, in this case, Plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently allege a gender-based hostile work environment that would constitute sexual harassment under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL. Under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff need only plausibly allege that she was subjected to “unwelcome gender-based conduct.” Mitura v. Finco Services, 12 F. Supp. 3d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Mayorga v. Greenberg, 22–CV–387, 2023 WL 6307994, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2023)). Under the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that she was subjected to inferior “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of” her gender. 12 F. Supp. 3d at 453. For the gender-based harassment to constitute sexual harassment, it must involve “unwelcome verbal or physical behavior based on a person’s gender.” Stop Sexual Harassment Act, NYC Human Rights, https://www.nyc.gov/site/cchr/law/sexual-harassment-training-main.page (last visited Sept. 3, 2026).
The undersigned finds that the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint, if true, plausibly establish a set of facts that would meet this standard. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, after she began wearing a hijab in January 2025, Ahmed started treating her differently, including by avoiding eye contact, appearing visibly uncomfortable in her presence, and becoming agitated during interactions with her. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 41–42.) She further alleges that Ahmed thereafter subjected her to a pattern of hostile and demeaning conduct, including shouting at her, abruptly ending a Zoom call, dismissing her requests, and calling Plaintiff and her team “incompetent” in front of a subordinate. (Id. at ¶¶ 45–46.) Plaintiff alleges that she reported this conduct to Mr. Awad, who compared any intervention towards Ahmed to “trying to control an animal,” a sentiment he then applied towards another male executive. (Compl. at ¶¶ 27—30.) Mr. Amed allegedly acknowledged that Ahmed needed “softening,” but instead characterized Plaintiff as “emotional.” (Id.) See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (recognizing sex stereotyping as a form of gender discrimination).
Plaintiff identifies additional occurrences of sexual harassment in June 2025, when Ahmed allegedly cursed at Plaintiff for reporting his conduct to Mr. Awad, told her she was “embarrassing” herself, and stated, “You’re not the most intelligent person in the room.” (Pl.’s Opp. to Arbitration at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Ahmed did not direct these insults toward her male comparators. (See id.) To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Uddin, the only other Muslim women who worked for CEO Lawyer and wore a hijab, resigned after experiencing similar conduct by Defendants. (See id. at 7.) See Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 388 (2008) (Although such “me too” evidence is necessarily fact dependent, evidence concerning similar acts may support an inference of discriminatory animus where the circumstances are sufficiently related to Plaintiff’s claims). See also, Miro v. City of Bridgeport, 20–CV–346, 2023 WL 4992877, at *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2023) (“Similar acts of discrimination may likewise support a discriminatory hostile work environment.”). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants terminated her employment after she began wearing a hijab and after she formally reported Ahmed’s conduct to Human Resources. (See Pl.’s Opp. to Arbitration at 7.)
Not every allegation of gender–based mistreatment constitutes evidence of sexual harassment, and even accepting the more expansive definition of sexual harassment found in Owens, some forms of gender discrimination do not necessarily amount to sexual harassment. For example, Plaintiff’s allegations that she was excluded from Jallah or that Ahmed interfered with her ability to work, while unwelcome and allegedly gender-based, are neither physical nor verbal and therefore would not, standing alone, constitute “sexual harassment” under state and local law. However, Plaintiff’s allegations, viewed collectively, including allegations which involve verbal gender-based harassment, suggest that the treatment she experienced was not merely interpersonal conflict or isolated instances, but instead “unwelcome gender-based conduct” that subjected her to inferior “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” See Mitura, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 453 (finding a plausible NYSHRL sexual harassment claim based on allegations that the defendants called the plaintiff demeaning names, humiliated her in front of coworkers, and made jokes at her expense). As such, the allegations plausibly allege sexual harassment under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL, this case involves a sexual harassment dispute within the meaning of the EFAA, and the EFAA prohibits Defendants from compelling arbitration.
Accordingly, the court recommended that defendants’ motion to compel arbitration be denied.