In Dave v. 1661, Inc., No. CV 26-01043 (ES) (ADS), 2026 WL 2969449 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2026), a pregnancy discrimination case, the court denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration or dismiss.
Initially, the court held that the arbitration agreement was not nullified by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (the “EFAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–02.
As to that point, the court explained:
It appears that no court within the Third Circuit has held that pregnancy-based discrimination claims amount to sexual harassment such that they are subject to the EFAA. See Wiggins v. Netflix, Inc., No. 24-5643, 2026 WL 114377, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2026) (ordering further briefing from the parties as to whether the EFAA applies to plaintiff’s claims, as they “raise[ ] questions of first impression”); Carlton v. Nat’l Debt Relief LLC, No. 26-00944, 2026 WL 1430099, at *3–4 (D.N.J. May 21, 2026) (finding that the EFAA did not apply to plaintiff’s sex and pregnancy-based discrimination claims because her allegations did not amount to sexual harassment); Foster v. Horizon Dental Care at Steamtown, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-01424, 2026 WL 353243, at *8–9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2026) (determining that the plaintiff’s claims fell outside the scope of the EFAA and finding that “the allegations in the complaint may give rise to claims of sex or pregnancy discrimination,” but the plaintiff “fail[ed] to plausibly allege severe or pervasive sexual harassment”); Moulds v. Skillcycle, Inc., No. 23-4873, 2024 WL 2206464, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2024) (granting the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and finding that plaintiff’s claims do not fall within the scope of the EFAA by noting the distinction between sex discrimination and sexual harassment).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims center entirely on pregnancy and gender discrimination, rather than sexual harassment. This Court agrees. The facts, as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, do not indicate any form of sexual harassment that occurred. Indeed, Plaintiff asserts that she was terminated because of her pregnancy and that she took note of a pay disparity during her time employed at GOAT Group. (See generally Compl.). Without more, Plaintiff’s claims do not rise to the level of sexual harassment. Plaintiff argues that despite not being “styled as ‘sexual harassment,’ ” her claims still fall within the scope of the EFAA. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s claims, as they are currently pled, are not severe or pervasive enough that this Court could apply the EFAA.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the EFAA does not render the parties’ Arbitration Agreement unenforceable because Plaintiff has not “alleg[ed] conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute” pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 402(a).
(Cleaned up; citations omitted.)
However, the court held that a “restricted inquiry into factual issues” is necessary to properly evaluate whether there was a meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate.