In Morrison v. PWA Coalition of Dallas, Inc. et al, 3:25-CV-3066-S, 2026 WL 3309789 (N.D.Tex., Nov. 1, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s intersectional discrimination and hostile work environment claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
From the decision:
With respect to Plaintiff’s discrimination and hostile work environment claims under Section 1981, Plaintiff appears to assert an intersectional theory based on her race and sex. For example, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant’s adverse actions would not have occurred but for Plaintiffs race in combination with her sex—that is, but for her status as a Black woman” and that certain “Black-male comparators establish that the differential treatment of Plaintiff cannot be explained by race alone—men of Plaintiff’s race were treated more favorably—isolating sex as a distinguishing factor.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 118, 70 (emphasis added). Similarly, to support her hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a “racialized sexualization of [her] identity as a Black woman ” Id. ¶ 92 (emphasis added). “Because [S]ection 1981 claims apply only to race” and Plaintiff brings intersectional claims, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Section 1981 discrimination and hostile work environment claims with prejudice. See Ensley v. DeSoto Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:19-CV-2094-N, 2020 WL 2542602, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2020) (dismissing the plaintiff’s Section 1981 claims based “on color and sex” (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, dismissal was warranted.