Negligent Hiring, Retention, Supervision Claim, Based on Alleged Sexual Conduct By Russell Brand, Survives Summary Judgment

In Doe v. Russell Brand, No. 952136/2023, 2026 WL 3472216 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Nov. 02, 2026), the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s causes of action, against various corporate defendants (including Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.), for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision and general negligence, arising from Russell Brand’s alleged conduct.

After summarizing the black-letter law, the court applied it to the facts as follows:

Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, a jury could find that the corporate defendants, who it appeared did not look into Brand’s history for red flags, reasonably should have before they hired someone up-incoming and less well known,5 to be the lead actor and face of a major motion picture. Had they done so, they would have uncovered the publicly available information about Brand from the news articles and his autobiography, that by the corporate defendants’ own admission, would have likely precluded his hiring.6 Even if they had a duty to look into Brand’s background, the corporate defendants argue that an examination of the articles, in isolation, may not lead to the inference that Brand would commit sexual assault. Nevertheless, and despite defendants’ protestations for this mechanical approach, after examining everything available in their totality, a jury may find that it was reasonably foreseeable that a sex addict, self-described womanizer, who had a penchant for being overly flirtatious with many women (including co-workers and other film/tv talent whom he sometimes did have sexual relations with), who some referred to as a vile predator who was known for not taking no for an answer, who was known for crossing the line when it came to both workplace rules as well as societal convention, who had exposed himself previously,7 and was considered by at least one coworker to be a ticking time bomb, when hired to be the lead role and executive producer of a movie may ultimately cause the type of injury that plaintiff, an extra in the movie, alleged. Thus, the question of whether the corporate defendants had constructive knowledge of Brand’s propensities is a question of fact best left for the jury to decide.

Moreover, there is a question of fact as to whether the corporate defendants failed to act to prevent the alleged bathroom assault after receiving notice by the alleged exposure on set. Plaintiff testified that the exposure happened on the busy set in the line of sight of others. McCormick testified that he received no complaints but acknowledged that it would have been “very unlikely that if – if Russell Brand had exposed himself, that out of the several hundred people on the set, nobody would have noticed it.” McCormick’s statement can reasonably be interpreted as suggesting that if the allegation actually took place, then there were surely people there that would have seen it, but since he did not hear anything and there was no formal complaint it must not have happened. In other words, the corporate defendants find the plaintiff’s sworn deposition testimony to be incredible, but that is not the same thing as there being no evidence offered that defendants were on notice (compare with M.D. v State of New York, 88 Misc3d 663, 676 [NY Ct Cl 2025]). To the contrary, if a jury were to believe plaintiff’s account that Brand openly exposed himself on the busy set, then based on McCormick’s testimony, the jury would likely find that an agent of the corporate defendants witnessed it and, thus, had notice (see Vega v Restani Const. Corp., 18 NY3d 499 [2012][“it is not the function of a court deciding a summary judgment motion to make credibility determinations or findings of fact”]). Likewise, given plaintiff’s description of a crew member standing outside the bathroom, the testimony of who could possibly be on set, and McCormick’s testimony as to how Brand did have some staff on set provided by the corporate defendants, a question of fact remains as to whether the corporate defendants could have intervened to stop the alleged assault.

The court further held that the movants are not entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s general negligence claim, holding that this claim “is not duplicative of the negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims nor do the corporate defendants dispose of it by pointing to plaintiff’s inability to articulate what defendants could have done to keep her and extras safer” and that the movant “is not entitled to a finding that an assault would constitute a superseding or intervening cause as such a finding will ultimately turn on what a jury would find to be foreseeable.”

Share This:
© 2026 Pospis Law, PLLC. All Rights Reserved.