Retaliation Claims, Arising From Complaint About Confederate Flag Belt Buckle, Sufficiently Alleged

In Davis v. York & Whiting, LLC, 2026 WL 3548651 (M.D.Ga. Nov. 17, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. Title VII and § 1981.

In sum, plaintiff, who is African American, alleged that he endured various negative workplace actions after he reported a subcontractor’s employee’s belt buckle depicting the Confederate flag.

From the decision:

Title VII’s antiretaliation provision forbids employer actions that ‘discriminate against’ an employee … because he ‘opposed’ a practice that Title VII forbids or has ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in’ a Title VII ‘investigation, proceeding, or hearing.’ ” Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59-60 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 20000e-3(a)). “[T]he term ‘discriminate against’ refers to distinctions or differences in treatment that injure protected individuals.” Id. To establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, the employee must prove “that she engaged in statutorily protected conduct; she suffered an adverse employment action; and a causal relation exists between the two events.” Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2023).6 Protected activity includes an employee’s opposition to an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII. E.E.O.C. v. Total System Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3). An action is sufficiently adverse when that action “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Burlington N, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To show a causal relation, the Plaintiff must plausibly allege that the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.

Davis argues that he engaged in protected activity by opposing race-based harassment. ECF 34 at 12. After this protected activity, Davis claims he was subjected to an adverse employment action: Defendants ordered him to publicly enforce the policy prohibiting the conduct he had opposed. ECF 34 at 13. Davis argues that this would deter a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination complaint. Id. at 8. In the context of his retaliation claim, Davis argues this was not an ordinary job assignment. Id. at 13. He was the reporting employee, the complaint was race-related, Davis was the only non-white person on the jobsite to his knowledge, and the assignment exposed him to backlash risk, humiliation, and loss of authority. Id.; ECF 26 ¶ 49. Davis relies on the same facts to support his § 1981 retaliation claim.

Defendants’ motion rests on facts not in Davis’ amended complaint. Specifically, Defendants stated that York required all “superintendents (including Davis) to read the relevant Department of Defense policy and receive subcontractor sign-offs acknowledging their compliance.” ECF 30-1 at 11. Defendants read too much into the paragraphs they cite from the amended complaint, which state:

43. On July 20, 2025, Cambell sent an email acknowledging an “unsettling” experience and referencing the incident.

44. On July 22, 2025, Lancaster issued a subcontractor notice referencing DoD restrictions on displays on military installations and stating that display of the Confederate flag was not authorized under the policy ….

47. On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff was required to read the DoD policy aloud and collect signatures/acknowledgments from subcontractor personnel, including personnel from K&M Electric, Hamlin Air, and Green Plumbing.

The amended complaint does not make clear whether other superintendents had to read the DoD policy and collect acknowledgments as Davis was required to do. If Davis was the only person required to do this, it is plausible that forcing the person who made the complaint to enforce the policy aimed at the offensive conduct in a public manner could deter a reasonable worker from making such a complaint.

Finally, the Defendants claim that there is no but-for causation between the protected activity and the adverse action. ECF 30-1 at 16-17, 22. Defendants say that Davis was made to enforce the policy because of his supervisory role. Id. at 16. However, the policy was read aloud, and acknowledgments were collected shortly after and because of Davis’ complaint. ECF 26 at 6-7. Given that, Davis plausibly links the protected activity to the alleged adverse action. Therefore, as a matter of law, the Court cannot conclude that Davis fails to state Title VII and § 1981 retaliation claims.

(Cleaned up.)

The court also held that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a hostile work environment claim, finding that the alleged conduct did not meet the “severe or pervasive” standard.

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