From French v. County of Erie, 2018 WL 647470, at *1 (W.D.N.Y., 2018):
It is undisputed that the defendants met their burden of production of legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for plaintiff French’s termination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 130 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1998)). The burden shifted to plaintiff was to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext and a but-for causal connection between her complaints of discrimination and her termination. See e.g., Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 499 (2d Cir. 2009); see Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013)). As Magistrate Judge Foschio found, there is circumstantial evidence that could support a finding that plaintiff was fired in retaliation for having complained of discrimination. See Dkt. No. 27, pp. 26-30. And “whether retaliation was a ‘but-for’ cause, rather than just a motivating factor [for termination], is particularly poorly suited to disposition by summary judgment.” Zann Kwan v. Andalex Group LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846 n.5 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and the Court concludes on this record that a reasonable jury could possibly find that retaliation was the but-for cause of plaintiff’s termination.