In Goodson v. County of Plumas et al, 2023 WL 4678990 (E.D.Cal. July 21, 2023), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff proved that she was subjected to sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act – but that, as noted below, defendants were liable only under state law.
From the decision:
[A]n employee claiming harassment based upon a hostile work environment must demonstrate that the conduct complained of was severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex.” Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 36 Cal. 4th 446, 462 (2005) (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). To meet this standard, an employee must show both that she actually perceived the workplace as hostile or abusive and that “a reasonable person” in her position would have shared that perception, “considering all the circumstances.” Lyle, 38 Cal. 4th at 284. Those circumstances might include “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Miller, 36 Cal. 4th 462 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
Based on the evidence presented at trial in this case, Goodson meets this standard. Goodson showed she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex. Compton made several unwelcome comments about sex, touched her body, ground his pelvis against her, restrained her, grabbed her, hit her, bit her, licked her, said her body was his to do with as he liked and told her she knew she loved him. His behavior was severe and persistent, and he implied she would suffer negative consequences in her job and career if she reported him. Goodson found the environment hostile and abusive. She avoided Compton, protested, told him to stop, and eventually reported his behavior as sexual harassment. She came to the conclusion she could no longer do her job if it meant working with him, and she reported him despite her belief she might be ending her career in law enforcement as a result.
The County cannot prevail by pointing out that many other officers took part in juvenile, sexually charged and often violent roughhousing at work. Goodson did not complain about this “horseplay.” She complained about what Compton did—she feared him and asked him to stop—and his conduct was much more severe. His harassment also affected her severely. She developed post-traumatic stress disorder and depressive disorder. A reasonable person in Goodson’s situation would have found this harassment was severe and had created a hostile environment. Derogatory sexual comments, assaults, and physical interference with work are widely recognized as sexual harassment.
As to liability, however, the court reached different conclusions under state law, on the one hand, and federal law, on the other.
Specifically, it held that the alleged harasser was a “supervisor” under state law (imposing strict liability on the County), but that, under federal law, he did not have “authority to change her employment status” and that plaintiff did not show that the County was negligent.