In Jackson v. Management & Training Corporation, No. 4:23-cv-00066-MPM-JMV, 2024 WL 3352446 (N.D.Miss. July 8, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Defendant argued that plaintiff cannot show that the alleged harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, namely, that the alleged harassment is not “severe or pervasive.”
The court explained that the harassment is “severe or pervasive” when “(1) a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find it hostile or abusive, and (2) the plaintiff subjectively perceived the harassment as abusive” and further that “[i]n determining the objective element of the test, the court considers factors (each independently non-dispositive) such as: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”
As to the objective element, defendant argued, among other things, that plaintiff’s claims “at best[] exemplify the ordinary tribulations of the workplace[.]”
The court disagreed, noting:
If the defendant’s pared down version of the testimony was the extent of Jackson’s allegations, perhaps they would not be sufficiently severe or pervasive. In “summarizing” the plaintiff’s claims, however, MTC excluded necessary descriptors that contextualize the severity of the conduct alleged. The plaintiff has alleged much more than the sanitized version proffered by the defendant. For example, the plaintiff testified in her deposition that Lee “constantly” made remarks about her body and clothing, including saying to a coworker, “Oh, you see what she got on? You see them pants? See her ass in them jeans? Look her – look at her ass, and all that.” [32-1] at 12, 17. Though, technically, this would be considered a “comment[ ] on Jackson’s clothing,” describing it as such is disingenuous. The same can be said for the other categories outlined by the defendant.
The court continued, citing the following deposition testimony by plaintiff:
He started touching on my hair. I would ask him to stop. He’ll rub on my hair. I would ask him to stop touching me. He did that a few times, but – in front of people … [H]e used to come back there and act like he had to use the microwave in the office or he wanted some coffee out of there. But, like, he talking [sic] to Ms. Brown, and he would continue – like, try to touch my hand, and when he finally did get to the comfortable point of touching my hand, I kept telling him, Mr. Lee, leave me alone, and I will tell your wife.
And after the touching, he kept making remarks toward my clothing. I like them pants you got on. You look good in them pants. Them some picnic – I have picnic – and I would just tell him, you know, like, You need to quit saying stuff like that. And his wife, she – his wife was actually nice. She’s a nice lady. And I used to tell him, you know, You need to – I’m fixing to tell your wife on you. You need to stop that. What you doing? You need to leave me alone because I don’t like you like that. You have a wife. You need to focus on your wife. And he’ll say, I ain’t worried about that.
And it finally got to the point where he said, My wife don’t care. My wife like you, too. And so I was just, like, I don’t care about your wife liking me, you know. And so he’ll talk about – just randomly just bring up conversations about – at a previous job where him and his wife was talking to a female employee, but I kept telling him, That don’t have nothing to do with me. Can you just leave out of my office? But because I shared the office with other case managers, I couldn’t just, Hey, I need him out of here, because he used to make like he was coming in there to see the other case managers and not me, but I was the only one being uncomfortable. So I used to leave my office, and I’ll go back to my old office just to get away from him, and I’ll sit in there and try to do my work.
The court concluded that while the defendant may consider these instances “ordinary tribulations of the workplace,” the court did not, finding that “[t]he conduct she describes throughout her complaint and deposition meets the criteria outlined by the Fifth Circuit because it was: (1) frequent, as she describes the conduct occurring constantly over several months; (2) humiliating, as several alleged instances of sexual comments occurred in front of coworkers; and (3) interfered with work performance, as she testified that she would go sit in her old office just to get work done.”
It went on to cite additional detail provided by plaintiff in her response to the motion.
As to the “subjective” component of the test, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to meet this element because “if she had actually been offended by” the alleged conduct she would have quit.
The court disagreed, explaining:
This argument is remarkably insensitive and is blind to the realities of working-class America. Most individuals have families relying on them for support and, without an alternative source of income, do not have the luxury of leaving a job. They do, however, have the right to be free from harassment in the workplace, and these rights are not diminished simply because a person is not privileged enough to willingly forgo a paycheck. Such is the case here.5 Jackson provided ample evidence that she subjectively considered the harassment hostile and abusive: she told Lee on many occasions that his conduct made her uncomfortable and repeatedly complained of the harassment to coworkers and supervisors. Furthermore, Jackson began taking her work into another office just to avoid Lee. The plaintiff has also satisfied the subjective element.
Based on the foregoing, the court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim.