In Nahar v. ADR Ventures WPR LLC, 23-CV-3835 (VSB), 2024 WL 4042433 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2024), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged religious-based discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.
As to Title VII and the state law, the court explained:
Putting these allegations aside, I next consider whether the remaining allegations in the Amended Complaint give rise to a plausible inference of discriminatory animus. Those allegations consist principally of Andy’s hijab-related comments. In evaluating these statements, I consider the following four non-dispositive factors: “(1) who made the remark, i.e., a decisionmaker, a supervisor, or a low-level co-worker; (2) when the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at issue; (3) the content of the remark; and (4) the context in which the remark was made, i.e., whether it was related to the decisionmaking process.” Luka v. Bard Coll., 263 F. Supp. 3d 478, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Considering these factors, I conclude that Andy’s comments give rise to an inference of religious-based discrimination. Although it is unclear what Andy’s precise role was in the termination of Nahar’s employment, the Amended Complaint alleges that he was Nahar’s supervisor with authority to fire her, and he apparently had some responsibility or control over scheduling her to work. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 24.) Indeed, Nahar believed Andy was involved in the decision to end her employment and tried to contact him to inquire as to why she had not been included on the shift schedule. (Id. ¶ 24.) With respect to the second factor, Nahar alleges that Andy made discriminatory remarks “regularly.” (Id. ¶ 17.) To be sure, Nahar does not allege the precise timing of Andy’s remarks. However, Nahar worked for Dunkin for less than thirteen months, (id. ¶¶ 13, 24), capping the amount of time that could have possibly elapsed between Andy’s remarks and Nahar’s termination, see, e.g., Papalia v. Milrose Consultants, Inc., No. 09-CV-9257, 2011 WL 6937601, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2011) (finding inference of discrimination where the discriminatory comments were made one year prior to the plaintiff’s demotion). As to the third and fourth factors, Andy’s unprompted and repeated comments about Nahar’s wearing a hijab at work—e.g., “The customers will be scared” and “You will drive the customers away,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 17)—draw a plausible connection between Andy’s views about Nahar’s religious practices and the otherwise unexplained decision to stop scheduling her for shifts. This connection is further supported by the fact that Nahar observed Andy tell another woman looking to begin employment at Dunkin not to wear her hijab in the store. (Id. ¶ 21.) Together, these allegations give rise to a plausible inference of religious discrimination. See Vega, 801 F.3d at 84 (explaining that the plaintiff “need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation” to survive a motion to dismiss (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, Andy’s actions and comments provide circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus sufficient allow Nahar’s discrimination claims to proceed to discovery, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Title VII, and NYSHRL claims is DENIED.
Having found that plaintiff plausibly alleges claims under federal and state law, it necessarily found that plaintiff likewise plausibly alleged that claim under the more lenient New York City Human Rights Law.