In Sargent v. Amazon.com, Inc., Civil Action No. 23-1330-RGA, 2024 WL 3936490 (D.Del. Aug. 26, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race-based hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on Defendants’ inaction in removing the offensive graffiti.
Title VII prohibits racial discrimination that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). “To succeed on a hostile work environment claim under Title VII and § 1981, an employee must establish that (1) he suffered intentional discrimination because of his protected characteristic, (2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive, (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.” Sousa v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2023 WL 7486751, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 13, 2023) (quoting Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013)) (cleaned up); see also Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the elements of employment discrimination claims are “generally identical” under § 1981 and Title VII). “[T]he evidence needed to prevail under the DDEA is generally the same as that needed to prevail under Title VII.” Hyland, 608 F. App’x at 82. The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation omitted).
Defendants maintain Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because the Third Circuit has held that “alleged racist graffiti randomly placed throughout the workplace … in and of themselves are not enough to support a viable hostile work environment claim.” (D.I. 6 at 9 (citing Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 263 (3d Cir. 2005); Woodard v. PHB Die Casting, 255 F. App’x 608, 609–10 (3d Cir. 2007); Fields v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 606 F. Supp.3d 66, 114–115 (E.D. Pa. 2023)). Defendants’ cited cases, none of which deal with the pleadings stage, do not stand for the broad proposition that graffiti is categorically insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim. On the contrary, the court in each case based their conclusions on specific factual findings after conducting a thorough analysis of the record. See Caver, 420 F.3d at 263 (noting Plaintiff never personally saw the racist graffiti or flyers); Woodard, 255 F. App’x at 610 (finding one incident of racist graffiti and the Defendant’s failure to remove it promptly did not allow a trier of fact to find in Plaintiff’s favor); Fields, 696 F. Supp. 3d at 115–116 (noting that Plaintiffs often did not report the graffiti that occurred sporadically over the course of seven years and that, when they did report it, all but one of Plaintiffs’ supervisors took the complaints seriously). I see no reason why racially and sexually offensive messages and graffiti categorically could not support a viable hostile work environment claim at the motion to dismiss stage.
Defendants point out, “The Complaint lists multiple examples of the graffiti, but none reference Sargent.” (D.I. 6 at 10). Defendants argue this warrants dismissal of Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim because Plaintiff “fails to allege that any of the graffiti at [the workplace] would not have been written but for his race or was directed at him specifically.” (Id. (analogizing to Caver, 420 F.3d at 263) (emphasis omitted); see Caver, 420 F.3d at 263 (“Davis cannot meet the first element of the hostile work environment claim under Title VII …—causation—solely by pointing to comments that were directed at other individuals.” (emphasis omitted))).
Defendants appear to suggest that Caver provides for a blanket rule that graffiti, absent some indication in its message that a particular individual is its intended target, cannot be “directed at” someone (even if, for example, the graffiti is directed at a minority group to which that person belongs). The Caver court, however, never discussed this issue. See Caver, 420 F.3d at 263 (finding insufficient evidence to support a hostile work environment claim because no racist comments were directed at Plaintiff and because Plaintiff never personally saw any racist graffiti or flyers). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s position runs counter to the Third Circuit cases that explain that “conduct can make a workplace hostile even if it was not directed at the plaintiff.” Norris v. NIMK Pennsylvania LIC, 2024 WL 1209747, at *6 (3d Cir. Mar. 21, 2024) (citing Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A] plaintiff may show that, while she was not personally subjected to harassing conduct, her working conditions were nevertheless altered as a result of witnessing a defendant’s hostility towards other women at the workplace.”)).
Based on this, the court concluded that plaintiff’s pleading of his hostile work environment claim sufficient to survive at the motion to dismiss stage.