In Joseph v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 2024 WL 4705544 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2024), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 does not create an implied right of action for sex discrimination in employment.
From the decision:
Congress passed Title IX in June 1972 as part of a series of amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other antidiscrimination statutes. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 extended first Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination to federal employees and educational institutions. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 701–02, 86 Stat. 103, 103–04 (Mar. 24, 1972). That extension to educational institutions responded to “the widespread and compelling problem of invidious discrimination in educational institutions.” Univ. of Pa. v. Equal Emp. Opp. Comm’n, 493 U.S. 182, 190, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990). The amendment “expose[d]” employment decisions in educational institutions to the “same enforcement procedures applicable to other employment decisions” under Title VII—the “integrated, multistep enforcement procedure that enables the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission to detect and remedy instances of discrimination.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And Title IX extended next Title VI’s protections against discrimination in federally funded programs to cover sex discrimination in educational institutions. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (June 23, 1972). But Title IX’s enforcement mechanism relied on the carrot and stick of federal funding to combat sex discrimination.
Passed only three months apart, the 1972 amendments evince a congressional intent to create a comprehensive antidiscrimination remedial scheme. As amended, Title VII and Title IX work in tandem: “whereas Title VII aims centrally to compensate victims of discrimination, Title IX focuses more on protecting individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal funds.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287, 118 S.Ct. 1989 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 757.
The two statutes accomplish these goals through different remedies. Title VII creates an administrative process that requires claimants first to file a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and then obtain a right to sue letter from the Commission before filing a complaint in a federal court. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4–2000e-5. Title IX, in contrast, empowers administrative agencies to condition federal funding on compliance with its anti-sex-discrimination mandate. 20 U.S.C. § 1682. Although it also provides an implied right of action for students—who would otherwise have no statutory remedy to enforce their substantive right under Title IX—the terms of the statute do not embrace a private right of action for employees.
It is unlikely that Congress intended Title VII’s express private right of action and Title IX’s implied right of action to provide overlapping remedies. Judicially implied rights of action require expressions of congressional intent to create both a right and a remedy. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511. In the light of the complexity of Title VII’s express remedial scheme, it would be anomalous to conclude that the implied right of action under Title IX would allow employees of educational institutions immediate access to judicial remedies unburdened by any administrative procedures. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (“[I]t would be anomalous to impute to Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially implied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable express causes of action.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289, 118 S.Ct. 1989. That conclusion becomes even weaker when we remember that Congress extended Title VII’s remedies to employees of educational institutions only three months before enacting Title IX. And because Title IX was enacted under the Spending Clause, it is dubious that recipients of federal funds would understand that they have knowingly and voluntarily accepted potential liability for damages for claims of employment discrimination under Title IX when those kinds of claims are expressly provided for and regulated by Title VII. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286–87, 118 S.Ct. 1989 (distinguishing Title IX’s “contractual framework” from Title VII’s express prohibition and limiting the scope of available remedies under Title IX).
Having determined that Title IX does not create an implied right of action for sex discrimination in employment, the court reversed the order denying the dismissal of the claims against one employee (Crowther), and affirmed the judgment against another employee (Joseph).