In Wright v. White Plains Hospital Medical Center, No. 2023-05430, 64135/19, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 02371, 2025 WL 1173144 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., Apr. 23, 2025), the court affirmed the award of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual or to discharge such a person from employment on the basis of the individual’s gender (see id.; Golston–Green v. City of New York, 184 A.D.3d 24, 34, 123 N.Y.S.3d 656). “Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is a form of gender discrimination” (Golston–Green v. City of New York, 184 A.D.3d at 34, 123 N.Y.S.3d 656; see Lefort v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 203 A.D.3d 708, 709, 164 N.Y.S.3d 183).
The standards for establishing unlawful discrimination under the NYSHRL previously were the same as those governing title VII cases (see Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 N.Y.2d 326, 330, 763 N.Y.S.2d 518, 794 N.E.2d 660; Ferrante v. American Lung Assn., 90 N.Y.2d 623, 629, 665 N.Y.S.2d 25, 687 N.E.2d 1308). In 2019, however, the New York State Legislature amended the NYSHRL, in pertinent part, to require that it “be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article, have been so construed” (Executive Law § 300; L 2019, ch 160, § 6; see Golston–Green v. City of New York, 184 A.D.3d at 35 n 1, 123 N.Y.S.3d 656). That amendment was effective August 12, 2019 (see L 2019, ch 160, § 16), and applies to causes of action, like the instant cause of action, that are filed on or after the effective date (see id. § 16[d]; Elco v. Aguiar, 226 A.D.3d 649, 651, 208 N.Y.S.3d 696; Golston–Green v. City of New York, 184 A.D.3d at 35 n 1, 123 N.Y.S.3d 656).
As a result of the amendment, the NYSHRL now aligns with the standards of the New York City Human Rights Law (hereinafter the NYCHRL) (see Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–130[a], [b]; Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 41 N.Y.3d 446, 451, 211 N.Y.S.3d 819, 235 N.E.3d 351; Cannizzaro v. City of New York, 82 Misc.3d 563, 577, 206 N.Y.S.3d 868 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. County]; Stickler v. IBM, Inc., 2024 WL 3952639, *2 n 4, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154797, *4 n 4 [S.D.N.Y., No. 22–CV–2449 (KMW)]; Harlow v. Molina Healthcare, Inc., 723 F.Supp.3d 116, 129 n 6 [N.D.N.Y.]). Under the NYCHRL, unlawful discrimination must play “no role” in an employment decision (Singh v. Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC, 131 A.D.3d 1158, 1161, 16 N.Y.S.3d 611 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lefort v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 203 A.D.3d at 711–712, 164 N.Y.S.3d 183). Thus, a defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be analyzed under both the familiar framework of (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668) and under the newer mixed-motive framework, which imposes a lesser burden on a plaintiff opposing such a motion (see Reichman v. City of New York, 179 A.D.3d 1115, 1117, 117 N.Y.S.3d 280; Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 A.D.3d 665, 668, 115 N.Y.S.3d 53; Hamburg v. New York Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 155 A.D.3d 66, 72–73, 62 N.Y.S.3d 26). “A defendant must make ‘a prima facie showing that there is no evidentiary route that could allow a jury to believe that discrimination played a role in their challenged actions’ ” (Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 A.D.3d at 668, 115 N.Y.S.3d 53, quoting Cenzon–Decarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 101 A.D.3d 924, 927, 957 N.Y.S.2d 256; see Lefort v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 203 A.D.3d at 712, 164 N.Y.S.3d 183). “A plaintiff may defeat summary judgment by coming forward either with evidence that the defendant’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination or with evidence that discrimination was one of the motivating factors for the defendant ‘s conduct” (Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 A.D.3d at 668, 115 N.Y.S.3d 53; see Hamburg v. New York Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 155 A.D.3d at 73, 62 N.Y.S.3d 26).
Applying these principles, the court held that the defendant demonstrated “that there was no evidentiary route that could allow a jury to find that discrimination played a role in the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment” and that plaintiff “failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the proffered explanations were a pretext for discrimination or whether discrimination was one of the motivating factors for the challenged action” and “offered nothing but speculation that the decision to terminate her employment was motivated, even in part, by unlawful discrimination, which is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”