In Kukreja v. Scientific Systems Company et al, 24-CV-1364 (SFR), 2025 WL 1549071 (D.Conn. May 30, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s disability-based hostile work environment claim asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
In sum, plaintiff alleged that he incurred injuries while on a work trip, and that (for example) while on leave he was required to perform significant work and pressured to return to work, and that upon his return to work, he was “treated in an inhumane manner and subjected to harassment.”
From the decision:
In Counts 10 and 12, Kukreja alleges that SSCI subjected him to a hostile work environment as a result of his injuries. Defendants argue that this claim is time barred because every underlying act, except for Kukreja’s termination, occurred outside the 300-day limitations period. Kukreja argues that the acts underlying the hostile-work-environment claim constitute a continuing violation and are therefore not time barred. Defendants respond that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply because all of the facts underlying the hostile work environment claim, save Kukreja’s termination, occurred outside the statutory period, and a discriminatory termination claim cannot serve as the foundation for a continuing violation theory of a hostile work environment as [a]n employee’s termination is the paradigmatic discrete act that cannot be part of a hostile work environment claim.
Because a constellation of events over time can collectively give rise to a hostile environment claim, if an act contributing to the [hostile environment] occurs within the filing period, the hostile work environment claim is timely, and a factfinder can hold a defendant liable for the entire time period of the hostile environment, including the period falling outside of the limitations period. King v. Aramark Servs. Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 560 (2d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). As Kukreja observes, King stated: “[W]e have never held that a discrete act that furthers a discriminatory policy and occurs within the limitations period cannot render timely a hostile environment claim based upon that policy. Today, we make it clear that such a discrete act can do so.” In other words, the King court held that timely discrete acts, including termination, can serve as an anchor for otherwise untimely conduct that, taken together, constitute a hostile work environment.
Here, Kukreja alleges that SSCI created a hostile work environment by, among other things, overworking him, humiliating him, and delaying his disability paperwork, eventually culminating in his termination. The parties agree that these alleged acts were outside the limitations period, except for Kukreja’s termination, which occurred within the limitations period. Under King, I may consider the earlier acts alleged by Kukreja because they are a part of the hostile work environment that led ultimately to his termination. Taking Kukreja’s factual allegations as true at the motion to dismiss stage, Kukreja has alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to plausibly state a hostile work environment claim, with the allegations about various events regarding SSCI’s actions toward Kukreja anchored by Kukreja’s termination.
[Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]
Based on this, the court held that dismissal was not warranted.