In Baxter v. Swiftshift Inc., 24cv6241 (DLC), 2025 WL 1677712 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2025), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged claims of hostile work environment, under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws, because of her sex and domestic violence victim status.
From the decision:
Baxter has also stated a claim for hostile work environment under state and city law. Under state and city law, a plaintiff need not allege “either materially adverse employment actions or severe and pervasive conduct.” Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 114. Baxter has met the low burden under these statutes by alleging that she was treated “less well” because of her sex. Id. at 110 (citation omitted). The FAC alleges that Shalvi subjected her to threatening rants, ignored her comments in meetings, cut her off mid-sentence, and reprimanded her when she did not immediately comply with his directives — behavior that Shalvi did not use with male co-workers. The FAC alleges that Nelson was also subjected to condescending and sexist remarks.
For similar reasons, Baxter has stated a claim for hostile work environment based on her status as a domestic violence victim. Baxter asserts that the discriminatory treatment she faced by Shalvi became more severe after she obtained a TRO from the New Jersey family court because of his mistreatment of her in their home. This is sufficient to state a claim that defendants created a hostile work environment based on her status as a victim of domestic violence.
The defendants assert that they were not aware that Baxter was a victim of domestic violence. But Baxter alleges that Shalvi, Swiftshift’s CEO, was the perpetrator of this alleged domestic violence, so at a minimum he knew about Baxter’s status. This is a not a case, therefore, where discriminatory intent is inferred “from circumstances unknown” to the persons who participated in the adverse employment action. Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 82 (2d Cir. 2005).
Finally, the defendants contend that Baxter’s allegations of hostile conduct “occurred in the context of her personal divorce from Shalvi and included disputes over” matters personal to their relationship, such as “their shared bank account.” In the same vein, they suggest that Baxter’s workplace allegations “are at best petty slights that are not actionable.” As explained, Baxter has cleared the low bar of pleading that she was treated “less well” because of her sex and her status as a domestic violence victim.
Accordingly, the court held that dismissal was not warranted.