In Edwards, Robert v. JBS Souderton, Inc., CIVIL ACTION No. 23-1789, 2025 WL 1888204 (E.D.Pa. July 8, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race-based hostile work environment claim, based on the alleged use of a racial slur, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
From the decision:
To state a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff employee must allege facts plausibly showing that: “(1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her [race], (2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive, (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.” Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 263 (alterations in original); see also Verdin v. Weeks Marine Inc., 124 F. App’x 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 826 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994)) (noting same standard for hostile work environment claim under Section 1981 and Title VII).
Plaintiff J. Robinson first alleges that because of understaffing in the “shackler” position at JBS, which was staffed with a disproportionately high number of Black employees, he was made to work harder for less pay. (See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 208–11, ECF 48.) J. Robinson also contends his “exclusively non-[B]lack Hispanic supervisors” frequently referred to Black employees as “moyo,” a term he alleges is a Spanish-language slur for Black people. (Id. at ¶¶ 213–14.)
In moving to dismiss this claim, Defendant argues Plaintiff Robinson fails to plausibly allege that the disproportionate number of Black employees in the shackler position was intentional and not the result of some other, more coincidental, reason. Defendant further contends that “moyo” is not “on its face, objectively offensive,” and there are no other facts alleged to suggest this word is in fact a slur, so the severe or pervasive threshold has not been met. (Def.’s Mot. Dis. 14, ECF No. 55-1No. 55-1.)Notably, a hostile work environment claim requires allegations of either severe or pervasive discrimination, a less exacting standard than requiring both severity and pervasiveness. See Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264. Thus, while an isolated instance of discrimination may be severe enough to infect a workplace with hostility, many less-severe instances of discrimination may also be pervasive enough to do the same. Id. (citing Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 2006)). In evaluating whether discrimination rises to the requisite level of severity or pervasiveness, courts consider: the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Doe v. Triangle Doughnuts, LLC, 472 F. Supp. 3d 115, 132 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001)) (internal quotations omitted).
Taking J. Robinson’s factual allegation as true that “moyo” is a Spanish-language racial slur for Black people, I find J. Robinson has pled a viable claim. See Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 265 (holding single use of n-word sufficient to state a claim for hostile work environment when spoken by a supervisor). Defendant’s reliance on nonbinding cases is unavailing.2 These cases are factually dissimilar and the terms in dispute were not alleged to be slurs, but only offensive or racially-charged terms.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that allegations of the use of a racial slur by a supervisor is enough to plausibly allege a hostile work environment at the pleading stage. Id.
The court concluded by noting that “[w]hether ‘moyo’ is a racial slur against Black people is a question of fact, not appropriate for disposition at this early stage.”