In Garcia v. Westhampton Primary Care, Maria Barlowe, Marie Alessi, and StaffCo of Brooklyn, LLC, 2025 WL 2614945 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2025), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff plausibly alleged a race-based hostile work environment claim ,as well as for a retaliatory hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Here, the Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that Garcia faced a hostile work environment both because of her race and because of her engagement in protected activities. With respect to Garcia’s claim that she faced a racially hostile work environment, the Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that she faced harassment that was both severe and pervasive. (See, e.g., SAC ¶ 13 (alleging multiple instances of racially offensive remarks by Cyphers); id. ¶¶ 15–16 (alleging multiple instances of Durand treating Garcia and another minority employee with “hostility and disrespect” in front of patients); id. ¶ 19 (alleging that Durand screamed at Garcia in front of patients); id. ¶ 20 (alleging that Durand stated that “Blacks will never amount to anything” and “All of the Spanish are illegals,” and that Garcia heard these statements); id. ¶ 23 (alleging that Durand said that she was “coming for [Garcia’s] blood”).) Further, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that race was the cause of the hostile work environment, in particular because many of the alleged comments described above directly showed racial animus. Id. ¶¶ 13, 22; see Porter v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 92 F.4th 129, 149 (2d Cir. 2024) (holding that “statements … may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude”).
With respect to Garcia’s claim that she faced a retaliatory hostile work environment, the Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleges, at a minimum, that she engaged in protected activities when she reported Durand’s threats and racially charged statements on October 7, 2021 (SAC ¶ 23) and when she filed an EEOC charge on October 5, 2022 (id. ¶ 4). It also alleges that Garcia faced severe and pervasive harassment—in particular by Barlowe—following one or both of these protected activities. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 27–39 (alleging that Barlowe repeatedly pressured Garcia’s co-workers to provide negative feedback about her); id. ¶ 34 (alleging that Barlowe improperly assigned Garcia to cover every late shift, in violation of company policy and the applicable collective bargaining agreement); id. ¶ 42 (alleging that Barlowe went “out of her way” to falsely blame Garcia for a patient receiving an incorrect COVID test result); id. ¶ 43 (alleging that Barlowe attempted to block Garcia from receiving a promotion); id. ¶ 44 (alleging that Barlowe instructed Dirma not to speak to Garcia).) The Second Amended Complaint plausibly states a causal relationship between the protected activity and the harassing behavior, including because it alleges that Barlowe specifically sought advice from Hervan regarding how to “get rid” of Garcia and told Alessi that “two people have left because of [Garcia’s] toxicity.” (id. ¶¶ 28, 35.) Further, at the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff may rely on temporal proximity between the alleged protected activity and the alleged retaliation to make a prima facie showing of retaliation. See Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp., LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir. 2013); see, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 23, 34 (alleging that Garcia complained on October 7, 2021 and Barlowe reassigned Garcia’s shift in late October 2021).
Defendants’ arguments that the alleged conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to state a hostile work environment claim are unavailing. Westhampton Primary Care’s argument that the statements made by Cyphers and Durand, which Garcia either overheard or learned second-hand, “were not directed at [Garcia]” (Westhampton Primary Care Mem. at 8) is incorrect for two reasons. First, it is well-settled that racially hostile actions need not be within the presence of the plaintiff or directed at the plaintiff in order to contribute to a hostile work environment. See Leibovitz v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e recognize that evidence of harassment directed at other co-workers can be relevant to an employee’s own claim of hostile work environment discrimination.”). Second, as a factual matter, some of the alleged statements by Durand were “directed at” Garcia—for example, Durand’s comment that she was “coming for [Garcia’s] blood.” (SAC ¶ 23.) Further, Defendants’ argument that the alleged hostile actions were too isolated or sporadic ignores the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint, which detail numerous incidents involving multiple coworkers over a period of approximately four years. (See generally SAC.)
Defendants’ arguments that the Second Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege causation are also unpersuasive. As to Garcia’s hostile work environment claim on the basis of race, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that both Cyphers and Durand made offensive statements specifically referencing race and ethnicity. (See, e.g., SAC ¶ 13 (alleging that Cyphers used racial slurs); id. ¶ 20 (alleging that Durand said “Blacks will never amount to anything” and “[a]ll of the Spanish are illegals”).) As to Garcia’s retaliatory hostile work environment claim, as noted above, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Barlowe specifically asked Hervan how to “get rid” of Garcia after Durand resigned in the face of Garcia’s complaints about her alleged racially hostile behavior. (Id. ¶ 28.)
The court further held that, since the complaint sufficiently alleged these claims under Title VII, it likewise stated a claim under the more permissive New York State Human Rights Law.