In Risner v. Thomas E. Creek VA Med. Ctr., No. 2:24-CV-202-Z-BR, 2025 WL 2899903 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on the ground that plaintiff failed to “exhaust administrative remedies.”
From the decision:
Here, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to any sexual harassment claims prior to filing suit. The subject matter of Complaint One is unknown, and Complaint Two contemplates non-sexual harassment. Thus, the VA’s EEO office was not afforded an opportunity to contemplate any sexual harassment claims prior to Plaintiff filing suit. And, even if Complaint One did concern Plaintiff’s alleged sexual harassment, Plaintiff affirmatively expressed her desire to withdraw her complaint and close her case. ECF No. 53-1 at 38. (Plaintiff stating over email that she “wish[es] to withdraw and close [her] case”). By doing so, Plaintiff abandoned her case and foreclosed the opportunity for final agency action. That Plaintiff argues she “at no time [intended] to foreclose herself from pursing [sic] a claim” against Government Defendant is immaterial. ECF Nos. 61 at 5, 53-1 at 47–52 (Notice of Rights and Responsibilities). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to any sexual harassment claims. See, e.g., Munoz v. Aldridge, 894 F.2d 1489, 1493 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that “notwithstanding the passage of 180 days, plaintiffs who resort to the administrative process but do not cooperate in the proceedings can thereby fail to exhaust their administrative remedies”); Filer v. Donley, 690 F.3d 643, 647 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing how “an employee may not base a Title VII claim on an action that was not previously asserted in a formal charge of discrimination to the EEOC”). (Cleaned up.)
Accordingly, based on this, the court determined that dismissal was warranted.