In Marlin v. Daniel P. Driscoll, Secy’ of the Army, No. 1:21-CV-00989 (CJN), 2025 WL 3640628 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s disability-based hostile work environment claim.
From the decision:
Marlin argues that she was “subjected to a hostile work environment from at least 2012 through 2019 by Ms. Bias-Streat” and that, although the “character of this hostile work environment shifted over the years … the motivation of Ms. Bias-Streat was consistent, to discriminate against [Marlin] on the basis of her disability.” Marlin Response 36. Marlin alleges that Bias-Streat “launched a campaign of micromanagement, over-scrutiny, and actions grossly in excess of her authority which frustrated [Marlin]’s ability to perform work during the period of 2012 through 2016,” and that “Bias-Streat also excluded [Marlin] from decision discussions for several years.” Id. Marlin claims that she sought the term appointment “to escape the situation created by” Bias-Streat, and that when Marlin attempted to return to her prior position, Bias-Streat “continued her systematic hostile behavior” by working to prevent Marlin “from regaining full-time, permanent, federal employment.” Id. at 37. Ultimately, Marlin argues, because of the hostile work environment created by Bias-Streat, Marlin was “permanently relieved of her job duties and responsibilities.”
A “plaintiff asserting a claim based on a hostile work environment faces a high hurdle,” and Marlin has not met it. Bain v. Off. of Att’y Gen., 648 F. Supp. 3d 19, 59 (D.D.C. 2022). (citation omitted). “[T]o sustain a hostile work environment claim,” Marlin “must produce evidence that she was discriminated against because of her [disabled status].” Nurriddin v. Goldin, 382 F. Supp. 2d 79, 107 (D.D.C. 2005) (citations omitted), aff’d sub nom. Nurriddin v. Griffin, 222 F. App’x 5 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Marlin does not point to any evidence suggesting that Bias-Streat’s alleged conduct toward Marlin was motivated by Marlin’s disability rather than a “simple personality conflict exacerbated by a lack of communication, trust, and respect” between Marlin and Bias-Streat.
Further, even assuming that Bias-Streat’s conduct was motivated by discriminatory animus, Marlin fails to demonstrate that a reasonable jury could conclude that Bias-Streat’s conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Marlin’s] employment.” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). Most of Marlin’s allegations involve quotidian workplace disputes that, until Marlin’s voluntary acceptance of the term position, led to no change in the conditions of Marlin’s employment. In other words, her “claims of harm are not supported by evidence of tangible workplace consequences, whether financial, physical, or professional,” and her “assertion of pervasive and constant abuse is undermined by the sporadic nature of the conflicts.”
To be sure, Marlin also argues that the hostile work environment culminated in her termination from federal employment. But by alleging only sporadic hostile conduct over several years, Marlin’s hostile work environment claim merely restates her discrimination argument, asserting in different words that Bias-Streat’s animus forced Marlin’s resignation.
(Cleaned up.)
Accordingly, on this basis, the court held that dismissal of this claim was warranted.