In Dunphy v. Giuliani, No. 650033/2023, 2026 WL 907841 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 30, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws on the grounds of jurisdiction (lack of connection to New York City) and timeliness.
From the decision:
The defendants seek dismissal of the State and City Human Rights Law (HRL) claims, arguing that Ms. Dunphy, a Florida resident, cannot show the discrimination had an impact in New York. The Court of Appeals has held that a nonresident, such as the plaintiff, “must plead and prove that the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact in New York [State and City, respectively].” (Hoffman v Parade Publs., 15 NY3d 285, 289 [2010]). The plaintiff is a Florida resident who was living in Florida at the time she purportedly interviewed for a job with Mr. Giuliani. She also makes specific allegations concerning events that took place in Florida. However, it is clear that a non-resident plaintiff need not be a resident of New York or New York City to bring claims under the New York State and City Human Rights laws. Whether New York courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a nonresident plaintiff’s claims under the State or City Human Rights Laws turns primarily on the plaintiff’s physical location at the time of the alleged discriminatory acts (see Wolf v Imus, 170 AD3d 563, 564 [1st Dept 2019]). Ms. Dunphy alleges she was flown to New York, introduced to staff in New York, and performed substantial work (and suffered severe abuse) inside Giuliani’s Upper East Side apartment. These allegations, and numerous others like them that are plead throughout the amended complaint, are more than sufficient to establish a sufficient nexus and impact in New York to survive a motion to dismiss.
The defendants also argue that the HRL claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the defendants have already conceded the applicability of the 228-day COVID-19 tolling period applies to this action. Second, Ms. Dunphy alleges a continuous pattern of sexual harassment and retaliation extending through her termination in January 2021, rendering her claims timely under the continuing violation doctrine.
The court further held that plaintiff stated aiding and abetting claims, noting that plaintiff ” alleges that Giuliani aided and abetted the Giuliani companies’ discriminatory conduct–specifically their failure to implement sexual harassment policies, lack of HR oversight, and condonation of his actions–and that the companies similarly aided and abetted Giuliani” and that “[a]n individual can be held liable for aiding and abetting an employer’s unlawful discrimination, even if the individual’s own actions served as the predicate.”