In Blake Lively v. Wayfarer Studios LLC, Justin Baldoni, et al, No. 24-CV-10049, 2026 WL 905447 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2026), the court, inter alia, held that actor Blake Lively was not protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Title VII only protects “employees,” but defines the term “employee” circularly as “an individual employed by an employer.” In assessing whether a person is an employee for purposes of Title VII, courts have applied the analysis derived from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992).
In sum, the court held that “[t]he undisputed facts reveal that Lively enjoyed a degree of economic independence sufficient to make her an independent contractor” and, upon analyzing the Reid factors, held that plaintiff Lively may not bring a claim under Title VII.
From the decision:
Analyzing the factors and the relationship as a whole, the relevant considerations overwhelmingly point in the direction of Lively being properly classified an independent contractor. Lively is a highly skilled artist who agreed to contribute her acting skills and name recognition to a single purpose entity for a single term-limited project for equity in the project with heavily negotiated approval rights over her own performance and key aspects of the project, and with the ability to accept and perform other work outside of a short six-week window (during which her presence on set was necessary for purposes of creative collaboration). Not only did she reserve substantial contractual control over her participation in the Film, but she exercised that control. The Court need not rely on her statement in the PGA Letter that she “produced every moment of this film” to see that her role far exceeded that of a traditional employee. She played a part in hiring and firing assistants, negotiated for the relocation of filming to be closer to her home, rewrote the script, conducted meetings with all department heads and the studio, oversaw a team of editors, and played a central part in shaping the Film’s “look,” marketing, and release. She enjoyed the economic independence to walk at any moment with the only consequence being that she would potentially be in breach of contract. And she exercised that independence in negotiating the terms under which she would return to work. She also enjoyed equity in the Film, ensuring that her compensation would be based not just on her own work but on the Film’s success as a whole.
There is limited caselaw bearing directly on the status of an actor as an independent contractor under the federal anti-discrimination laws. But the Court’s conclusion is consistent with the caselaw that does exist. In Alberty-Velez, the plaintiff was a host of a Puerto Rican television show, who signed a new contract for each episode and was required “to work a certain number of days (usually two) filming the show in a specific town,” during which time she was on-call for the entire day and subject to direction by the show’s producer, who “set the location and hours of filming” and “established the basic content of the program.” 361 F.3d at 4. The production company provided the equipment for filming but the plaintiff provided her own clothing and hair stylist. Id. The plaintiff was paid a lump sum amount for each episode with no withholding or benefits. Id. The First Circuit held that her claim for pregnancy and gender discrimination was properly dismissed on summary judgment because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that she was an employee. Id. at 11. Central to the court’s holding was its rejection of an argument strikingly similar to the one that Lively makes here—namely, that actors are employees whenever they receive directions during filming, are told where filming will occur, and are required to be on-call for certain hours during filming days. Id. at 9. The court explained that “[w]hile ‘control’ over the manner, location, and hours of work is often critical to the independent contractor/employee analysis,” context matters, and considering the industry at issue and “the tasks than an actor performs,” the types of control identified by the plaintiff were not indicative of employee status. Id. The control that came from the direction given to an actor by a director was inherent to the two roles and not indicative of the extent of their general independence from one another.
The court continued its analysis, ultimately concluding that the Wayfarer Parties are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII claims.