In Mendizabal v. Faria Meat Market LLC, No. 26-CV-062-JJM-AEM, 2026 WL 1025374 (D.R.I. Apr. 13, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.
From the decision:
Ms. Mendizabal also claims that she was subject to a hostile work environment when she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment and physical assault by a male coworker.
“To make out a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, [a plaintiff] must point to evidence showing, inter alia, that facts and circumstances of her employment viewed objectively were so ‘severe,’ ‘pervasive,’ and ‘abusive’ as to ‘alter the conditions’ of her job.” Bhatti v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 73 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Vega-Colon v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, 625 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2010)). However, a “plaintiff need only show that her work environment was severe or that it was pervasive.” Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 64 (1st Cir. 2019).
Courts consider several factors “including the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interfered with [the plaintiff’s] work performance.” Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 216 (1st Cir. 2003). The “ ‘accumulated effect’ of behaviors that individually fall short may, taken together, constitute a hostile work environment.” Maldonado-Catala v. Municipality of Naranjito, 876 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2017). Further, the Court is conscious of its role at this stage of the proceedings. “At the motion to dismiss phase in particular, subject to some policing at the outer bounds, the issue of whether harassment was severe or pervasive is commonly one of degree–both as to severity and pervasiveness–to be resolved by the trier of fact.” Rae v. Woburn Pub. Schs., 113 F.4th 86, 111 (1st Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted).
Ms. Mendizabal sufficiently alleges that a coworker who was related to Faria Market subjected her to a hostile work environment by: (a) inappropriate touching without consent; (b) physically slamming her against a wall; (c) pulling her by the hair; (d) attempting to suffocate her; and (e) closing a door on her hand, causing physical injury. ECF No. 1 ¶ 26. Given the frequency of the harassment and violent nature, the allegations state a claim based on a hostile work environment.
Furthermore, Faria Market’s timeliness argument is likewise unpersuasive. Under the continuing violation doctrine, a plaintiff may recover for otherwise time barred acts of discrimination “so long as a related act fell within the limitations period.” Ayala v. Shinseki, 780 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2015). A hostile work environment is a “classic example of a continuing violation” because the actionable wrong consists of an accumulation of “ ‘individual acts that, taken together, create the environment.’ ” Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 121, 130 (1st Cir. 2009). Thus, all the “component acts” alleged in a hostile work environment claim may be considered in determining liability, even if some occurred outside the limitations period. Id.
Here, Ms. Mendizabal stated she was subjected to abusive working conditions throughout her employment. While some of the alleged acts began outside the limitations period, she alleges that they culminated in her termination, which occurred in May 2023. As already explained, Ms. Mendizabal has sufficiently alleged that her termination was connected to the prior sexual harassment and physical assault. Thus, she has sufficiently alleged a severe and pervasive hostile work environment, and the continuing violation doctrine applies.
Accordingly, dismissal was not warranted, and plaintiff’s claim will continue.