In Ashleigh, Theophania v. The Mount Sinai Hospital, 2026 WL 1133711 (S.D.N.Y. April 27, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
From the decision:
Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an employer, rather than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily. Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). This is an objective standard: “Work conditions are ‘intolerable’ if they are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” Bright-Asante v. Saks & Co., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 3d 229, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 855 F. App’x 40 (2d Cir. 2021). In evaluating a claim of constructive discharge, the Court may consider time-barred conduct that Ashleigh alleges contributed to an intolerable work environment. See Fierro v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 994 F. Supp. 2d 581, 587 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Ashleigh’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim for constructive discharge. Ashleigh states, for example, that Fabian and other colleagues made racist and racially charged comments on several occasions (FAC ¶¶ 10, 12-14, 24), that she was repeatedly undermined in public by her colleagues (id. ¶ 25), that her colleagues modified her pager so that she missed critical communications while on shift (id. ¶ 26), that more work was foisted upon her compared to other residents (id. ¶ 27-28, 30-31), that little was done after she escalated her concerns about harassment to management (id. ¶¶ 46-50), that Fabian issued her inaccurate negative evaluations and “strongly suggest[ed]” that she pursue another career (id. ¶¶ 36-40, 41, 43), and that department leadership interfered with her efforts to transfer to a different residency program within Mount Sinai (id. ¶ 56-58), thus constructively forcing her to resign. Construed in the light most favorable to Ashleigh, the Amended Complaint describes myriad instances of mistreatment that raise an inference of race-based discrimination and that culminated in a work environment so antagonistic that a reasonable jury could find it intolerable to a reasonable person.
The court, accordingly, determined that it “cannot conclude at this juncture that Ashleigh’s allegations are insufficient as matter of law to support a constructive discharge claim” and that defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied as to plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim under § 1981.