In a recent decision involving a claim of race discrimination in employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Bravo v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 25-10982, 2026 WL 1531713 (5th Cir. June 1, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, the plaintiff was still required to prove discrimination circumstantially through evidence of a similarly-situated comparator.
From the decision:
Bravo concedes that our precedent required him to show a similarly situated comparator. But he argues that a recent Supreme Court decision, Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, overruled our previous cases that required him to do so. 605 U.S. 303, 145 S.Ct. 1540, 221 L.Ed.2d 929 (2025). We disagree.
Our rule of orderliness binds us to a previous panel’s decision “absent an intervening change in the law.” Texas v. United States, 126 F.4th 392, 406 (5th Cir. 2025). A Supreme Court decision may qualify as an intervening change, but the “decision … must unequivocally overrule prior precedent.” Id. (citation modified). The Court may do so implicitly when a decision “fundamentally changes the focus of the relevant analysis.” In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., 19 F.4th 787, 792 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). But this happens only if “the changed analysis clearly applies to the case before us, such that we are unequivocally directed … to overrule the” prior panel’s decision. Martinelli v. Hearst Newspapers, L.L.C., 65 F.4th 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation modified).
In Ames, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s rule that required “majority-group plaintiffs … to produce certain types of evidence … that would not otherwise be required to make out a prima facie case.” 605 U.S. at 311, 145 S.Ct. 1540. And the Court generally cautioned against “inflexible formulations of the prima facie standard.” Id. at 311, 145 S.Ct. 1540 (citation modified).
Of course, if our previous decisions placed a greater evidentiary burden on some groups, Ames might implicitly overrule them. But Ames’s clarification of the Title VII analysis does not clearly apply here. And our McDonnell Douglas authority is flexible enough to survive Ames. Indeed, our court has already cautioned that our review of whether a comparator employee is similarly situated “cannot be too rigid.” Moore v. Univ. Miss. Med. Ctr., 719 F. App’x 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Lee, 574 F.3d at 260 n.26).
Hence, our previous decisions that require a similarly situated comparator still bind us.2 To survive summary judgment, Bravo must offer evidence that he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee who was not a member of his protected class. E.g., Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at 998. Because he cannot, he fails to carry his prima facie burden under McDonnell Douglas, and the district court properly granted summary judgment.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.