In Dobbins v. Rollins, No. 25-1465, 2026 WL 1813421 (8th Cir. June 24, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s award of summary judgment on plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act.
From the decision:
Dobbins says her depression, anxiety, and PTSD disabled her and that she has direct evidence of discrimination. She points to her testimony that Parr called her “little girl”; told her to leave her home issues at the door; questioned her medical needs; and berated her for missing work, even when it was for medical or safety reasons. Proving discrimination via direct evidence is “rare” since “the evidence ‘must be strong and clearly point to an illegal motive.’ ” Huber v. Westar Foods, Inc., 139 F.4th 615, 622 (8th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (citation omitted), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 146 S. Ct. 885, 223 L.Ed.2d 274 (2025); see also Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1034 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying direct evidence standard to ADA claim).2 Dobbins’s evidence does not make this the rare case.
The first two alleged comments have nothing to do with Dobbins’s disability, so they cannot show “a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision.” Ebersole v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 758 F.3d 917, 924 (8th Cir. 2014). Parr’s discussing Dobbins’s health condition does not “clearly point to an illegal motive as the basis for” his decision. Id. (discussing employee’s medical condition “on several occasions” was “consistent with a new supervisor [ ] attempting to familiarize himself with a new subordinate” and was not direct evidence of discrimination); cf. St. Martin v. City of St. Paul, 680 F.3d 1027, 1033 (8th Cir. 2012) (questioning interviewee about his knee injury and discussing his medical status with HR representatives was not direct evidence that the City perceived him as disabled). Nor is there enough evidence that Parr’s angry outbursts and criticism were because of Dobbins’s disability, rather than a general frustration with her tardiness and absences. See, e.g., Huber, 139 F.4th at 624–25 (supervisor’s anger towards employee who missed work for a medical emergency was not sufficient direct evidence of discrimination because it could be attributed to her failure to communicate that she would be late or the lost business her absence caused, rather than her disability).
We also do not think that Dobbins has enough indirect evidence of discrimination to prove a claim under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. See id. at 623 (outlining the framework). Assuming she has established a prima facie case, she has not shown that USDA’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her—repeated and unexcused absences—was mere pretext for discrimination. See, e.g., Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 365–66 (8th Cir. 1996) (even if employee made out a prima facie case, summary judgment was appropriate where employer cited attendance policy violations as its nondiscriminatory reason and employee did not offer evidence supporting pretext).
To show pretext, Dobbins must cite evidence showing a genuine dispute that “discrimination was the real reason” for her termination. Huber, 139 F.4th at 625 (citation omitted). She can do so by showing USDA’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her has no basis in fact or that it is more likely that a prohibited reason motivated its decision. Id. Dobbins admits she was often late or absent, so she must point to evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that “the attendance policy was just an excuse for the decision to fire her.” Id.
Dobbins argues USDA’s treatment of another employee, who was granted 15 minutes of leave on a day Dobbins was not allowed any and who was told she could telework when necessary, shows pretext. See Schaffhauser v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 794 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 2015) (plaintiff may show pretext “by showing that an employer … treated similarly-situated employees in a disparate manner”). But Dobbins and the other employee were not similarly situated. USDA restricted Dobbins’s leave and telework because of her excessive absences. There is no evidence that the other employee had a history of unexcused absences. Id. (a comparable employee must be “similarly situated in all relevant respects,” including having “engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances” (citations omitted)).
Finally, we are not convinced that firing Dobbins for attendance reasons was discriminatory because her absences were related to her disability. She admits sometimes she missed work because of her children’s health and scheduling needs, not her disability. And her medical absences were only recorded as leave infractions when she failed to request time off in advance or when she would no-show and then not follow up with proper medical documentation. She does not allege that her disability stopped her from complying with USDA’s attendance procedures, so she has not shown discrimination on the basis of disability. See Huber, 139 F.4th at 627 (“[T]erminating an employee for workplace misconduct, even misconduct related to a disability, is not discrimination on the basis of disability.”
Accordingly, the court held that dismissal was warranted.