In Brenyah v. Columbia Hosp. Corp. of Bay Area, No. 25-40200, 2026 WL 2023814 (5th Cir. July 14, 2026), the court, inter alia, reversed a lower court’s award of summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s claims of race-based hostile work environment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
As to whether the alleged harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, the court explained:
For harassment to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment, it must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 651 (quoting Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002)). “Harassment is sufficiently ‘severe or pervasive enough’ to create a hostile work environment when it is ‘objectively hostile or abusive’—meaning ‘an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive’—and is subjectively perceived by the victim as abusive.” Johnson, 7 F.4th at 400 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
“The objective inquiry … requires that the court consider ‘all the circumstances,’ including ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’ ” Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’ ” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (citation omitted); Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., LLC, 23 F.4th 422, 433 (5th Cir. 2022). Second-hand harassment is relevant when assessing the totality of the circumstances but is “less objectionable than harassment directed at the plaintiff.” Arredondo v. Elwod Staffing Servs., Inc., 81 F.4th 419, 433 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Johnson v. TCB Constr. Co., 334 F. App’x 666, 671 (5th Cir. 2009)). The harassment “must affect [the employee’s] work environment.” Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 510 (5th Cir. 2003); see Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63–64 (2006) (noting that Title VII’s substantive provision is “limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment”—unlike its anti-retaliation provision, which extends to “actions not directly related to [a plaintiff’s] employment or [that caused] him harm outside the workplace”).
To support these claims, Brenyah points to her deposition testimony, Dike’s deposition testimony, and e-mails documenting frequent harassing incidents at Bay Area Hospital, which included: (1) comments by Hispanic nurses that their African food “st[ank],” (2) comments by a Hispanic nurse that black people “play the race card,” that a black nurse “[wa]s no longer Black” after visiting the Philippines and “upgraded” his race by marrying a Filipino, and that she “ha[d] a ‘thing for Filipinos,’ ” preferring them over black employees, (3) co-workers’ mockery of Brenyah’s Ghanaian accent; and (4) Sewell’s statement that minorities cannot discriminate. Brenyah also offers evidence of harassment that Dike suffered, some of which she witnessed, including: (1) being told by a Hispanic nurse to stay twelve feet away due to his race; (2) being reassigned away from patients to accommodate their desire not to be treated by a black nurse; and (3) being called racial slurs. She also provides evidence related to the incident at Doctors Regional, including: (1) employee reports that she was rude, unprofessional, and causing a disturbance at Doctors Regional; and (2) Sewell’s statement that he intended to issue her a disciplinary action for this behavior.
Brenyah asserts that the incidents at Bay Area Hospital occurred almost every shift and impaired her work, caused her to question how she could function in such an environment, and made her feel “less than human.” She also offers evidence that these incidents, as well as the incident at Doctors Regional, impacted her mental health, pointing to counseling records showing that she was distressed, traumatized, and afraid of being harmed.
A reasonable jury could rule in Brenyah’s favor on this element. Her evidence indicates that the alleged discriminatory conduct at Bay Area Hospital happened frequently—almost every shift. Her deposition testimony indicates that her work performance suffered as a result. Although the record does not show that the conduct was physically threatening, some of her co-workers’ comments were potentially humiliating, as opposed to mere offensive utterances. See Johnson, 7 F.4th at 400.
The second-hand harassment that Dike experienced also weighs in Brenyah’s favor when assessing the totality of the circumstances. See Arredondo, 81 F.4th at 433. Brenyah’s evidence related to the Doctors Regional incident is also relevant. Although Doctors Regional was not Brenyah’s workplace and she was on medical leave at the time of the incident, CCMC employees’ interactions with her caused professional consequences, as evidenced by the multiple reports that made it to Sewell’s desk and caused him to consider issuing Brenyah a disciplinary action. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63–64 (explaining that the reach of Title VII’s substantive provision is limited to actions “directly related to [a plaintiff’s] employment”); Gowesky, 321 F.3d at 510 (explaining that the harassment “must affect [the employee’s] working environment”).
The court further held that plaintiff has shown a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether CCMC knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.
Accordingly, the court held that dismissal was not warranted.