In Rosenberg v. Boces, No. 2024–11266, 2026 WL 2249474 (N.Y. App. Div. Aug. 5, 2026), the New York Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the lower court’s award of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims of disability discrimination, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, and constructive discharge in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL).
In sum, the plaintiff, a special education teacher, commenced this action against defendants alleging, inter alia, that they discriminated against her based on her disability—a health condition that allegedly put her at heightened risk during the COVID–19 pandemic—by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation in the form of allowing her to work remotely from home to teach at-home students during the 2020–2021 academic school year and, as a result, forced her into early retirement.
From the decision:
To make a prima facie showing of a violation of Executive Law § 296(1)(a), which prohibits discrimination in employment based upon a disability, the complainant must show that (1) he or she is a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was qualified to hold the position; (3) he or she was terminated from employment or suffered another adverse employment action; and (4) the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination” (Matter of Town of Hempstead v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 215 A.D.3d 973, 977, 188 N.Y.S.3d 582 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Executive Law § 296[1][a] ). An adverse employment action may include constructive discharge, which occurs “when the employer, rather than acting directly, deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation” (Morris v. Schroder Capital Mgt. Intl., 7 N.Y.3d 616, 621, 825 N.Y.S.2d 697, 859 N.E.2d 503 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). “Under the constructive discharge test, the actions of the employer in creating the intolerable workplace condition must be deliberate and intentional” (id. at 621, 825 N.Y.S.2d 697, 859 N.E.2d 503). Here, the defendants submitted evidence demonstrating, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action within the meaning of the NYSHRL and that, in any event, the denial of the plaintiff’s accommodation request was motivated by a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and that there was no triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants’ explanation was pretextual (see Reichman v. City of New York, 179 A.D.3d 1115, 1117, 117 N.Y.S.3d 280). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
(Citations omitted; cleaned up; emphasis added.)
Based on this, the court held that dismissal was warranted.