In Just v. Examone World Wide, Inc., No. 3:24-CV-1215 (AWT), 2026 WL 2529801 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
This case is instructive as to when a single incident is sufficiently severe to meet the Title VII “severe or pervasive” hostile work environment standard.
From the decision:
Although a single incident could be extraordinarily severe such that it can and does work a transformation of the plaintiff’s workplace, the plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that could support a conclusion that the January 11, 2023 incident rose to this level. Here, the plaintiff and Lee had ongoing issues regarding their relationship at work, and none of Lee’s conduct over the prior few months could be attributable to sexual harassment. At the time of Lee’s comment on January 11, 2023, the plaintiff was on the telephone discussing with Lavallee and Fitzpatrick her complaints about Lee. Lee had read certain emails between the plaintiff and Coelho on Coelho’s computer, and then Lee made a comment to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff asked Lee what she was talking about, Lee walked back to her desk. She then returned to the plaintiff’s desk and made the comment: “You can have your sister attack me all you want.” While Just was on the call with Lavallee and Fitzpatrick, Lee said “Did you guys know you hired a witch? She is a witch. She put a curse on all of us.” Lee told the plaintiff that she better watch her back and that Lee would make her life a living hell. After the call, Lee called Just a “b-tch” and a “c-nt.”
The plaintiff has not proffered evidence on which a jury could reasonably find that the single occurrence was extraordinarily severe. Any severity of Lee’s conduct “is … not severe enough to overcome the element of infrequency.” Davis v. Verizon Wireless, 389 F. Supp. 2d 458, 475 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
“There is little question that incidents that are facially sex-neutral may sometimes be used to establish a course of sex-based discrimination—for example, where the same individual is accused of multiple acts of harassment, some overtly sexual and some not.” Alfano, 294 F.3d at 375. But this is not a case where there are multiple acts of harassment and some are overtly sexual. The only acts proffered by the plaintiff are the statements that the plaintiff is a “witch” and that the plaintiff is a “b-tch” and a “c-nt,” which occurred in the context of a heated discussion after Lee read emails between Just and Coelho. These statements cannot support a conclusion that the plaintiff suffered a single incident of sexual harassment that was extraordinarily severe.
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)
The court cited various cases – Stepheny v. Brooklyn Hebrew Sch. for Special Children, 356 F. Supp. 2d 248, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (being called a “ ‘white [b-itch]’ or some variation thereof … five times over an approximately five month period” cannot be characterized as severe or pervasive); Beale v. Mount Vernon Police Dept., 895 F. Supp. 2d 576, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“courts have regularly concluded that the occasional use of [b-tch] is not severe enough to create a hostile work environment” and collecting cases); Fernandez v. Mac Motors, Inc., 205 Conn. App. 669, 682-83 (2021) (conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where, inter alia, another employee “made jokes in the workplace that were demeaning to female employees”; “used words such as ‘[b-tch],’ ‘whore,’ and ‘trashy’ when discussing women with other employees”; and yelled in the plaintiff’s face) – support its conclusion.