In Sierra v. Mount Sinai Health Sys., Inc., No. 152336/24, 2026 WL 2727837 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. Sept. 16, 2026), the court affirmed the lower court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s cause of action alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate disability in violation of the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
From the decision:
In November 2024, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants, inter alia, to recover damages for employment discrimination on the basis of disability and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (N.Y.SHRL) (Executive Law § 290 et seq.) and the New York City Human Rights Law (N.Y.CHRL) (Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–101 et seq.). The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that, in response to a policy implemented by the defendants in September 2021 requiring all employees to receive “the COVID–19 vaccine or face termination,” the plaintiff submitted a request for a medical exemption, supported by a medical record, on the ground that she suffered from severe and life-threatening allergic reactions to vaccinations and was advised by her physician not to receive this vaccine. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants denied the exemption request, refused to provide the plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation for her disability, and terminated her employment. Thereafter, the defendants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation but submitted only a memorandum of law with the notice of motion. The plaintiff opposed. In an order dated March 27, 2025, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied that branch of the defendants’ motion.
“[O]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court ‘must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint …, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Cahill v State of N.Y. Stony Brook Univ. Hosp., 139 AD3d 779, 780–781, quoting Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v Superior Well Servs., Inc., 20 NY3d 59, 63). “ ‘The ultimate question is whether, accepting the allegations and affording these inferences, [the] plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated’ ” (Perez v. Y & M Transp. Corp., 219 AD3d 1449, 1450–1451 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Doe v. Bloomberg L.P., 36 NY3d 450, 454).
The NYCHRL and NYSHRL forbid employment discrimination on the basis of an employee’s disability (see Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 NY3d 824, 833–834; Alvarez v. New York City Tr. Auth., 230 AD3d 541, 542). A court must construe all provisions of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL “broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible” (Albunio v. City of New York, 16 NY3d 472, 477–478; see Administrative Code § 8–130; Nazath v Our Lady of Consolation Nursing & Rehabilitative Care Ctr., 241 AD3d 946, 948).
Here, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and according the plaintiff every favorable inference, the complaint sufficiently pleaded a cause of action alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL (see Nazath v Our Lady of Consolation Nursing & Rehabilitative Care Ctr., 241 AD3d at 948).
The court thus concluded that the lower court properly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion, as it was based solely on unsupported arguments pertaining to information and documents outside the record.