In Egbueje v. Epiq EDiscovery Solutions, Inc., No. 24 CIV. 6702 (LDH) (VMS), 2026 WL 2690659 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2026), the court granted defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2022 (the “EFAA”) did not apply, since plaintiff did not plausibly allege that she was subjected to sexual harassment.
The court summarized the standards for evaluating a sexual harassment claim, in the context of the EFAA, as follows:
The Court first considers whether Plaintiff adequately pleads a sexual harassment claim under federal or New York law.2 If she did, it could trigger the EFAA and bar arbitration of some or all of her claims. As noted above, Second Circuit courts are divided over whether the EFAA requires a plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment to be “plausible” or merely “non-frivolous.” See Hankins v. Burlington Stores, Inc., No. 25 Civ. 2513 (NRM) (PK), 2026 WL 1480393, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2026) (discussing split within this Circuit).3 Given the evolving state of the case law around the interpretation of the EFAA, the Court will not weigh in on the correct pleading standard here. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to meet either standard.
The EFAA defines “sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” 9 U.S.C. § 401(4). Many courts in this Circuit have read “State law” to include municipal law, including the NYCHRL. See Owens, 786 F. Supp. at 843 n.2 (holding that “the term ‘State law’ in 9 U.S.C. § 401(4) encompasses the law of states’ subdivisions and therefore includes the NYCHRL”) (collecting cases). Plaintiff asserts sexual harassment claims under Title VII, the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL. See generally ECF No. 28 ¶¶ 37-52. Defendant has not argued against the proposition that the NYCHRL constitutes “State law” under the EFAA and addresses Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII, the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL.4 See Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 33 at 16-19; See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 38 at 7-9. Accordingly, the Court likewise analyzes Plaintiff’s claims under all three statutes but does not decide whether “State law” encompasses municipal law.
A workplace sexual harassment claim under Title VII can proceed under two theories: quid pro quo harassment and a hostile work environment. See Owens, 786 F. Supp. 3d at 847 (quoting Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 62 (2d Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff does not make any allegations of quid pro quo harassment. See generally ECF No. 28. A hostile work environment claim under Title VII requires allegations that the workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult, that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.” Waiguchu v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, No. 25 Civ. 7443 (GHW), 2026 WL 892069, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2026) (quotations & citations omitted). To prevail on a Title VII sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate “a causal connection between the gender of the individual or class and the resultant preference or disparity.” DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1986).
The NYSHRL and NYCHRL provide more liberal interpretations of “sexual harassment” than does Title VII. See Qorrolli v. Metro. Dental Assocs., 124 F.4th 115, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2024) (“The NYSHRL historically utilized the same standard as Title VII, but it was amended in 2019 to align with the NYCHRL’s more liberal pleading standard.”) (applying same standard for claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL at summary judgment). The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual because of an individual’s “gender identity or expression” or “sex,” among other categories. See N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(1)(a). The NYCHRL makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of the actual or perceived … gender … of any person … [t]o discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a)(3). The 2019 amendment of the NYSHRL “has been interpreted to align prospective constructions of the NYSHRL’s standards with the more lenient standards of the NYCHRL.” Allen v. City of New York, No. 24-2589, 2025 WL 3152723, at *3 n.2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2025) (citing Wright v. White Plains Hosp. Med. Ctr., 232 N.Y.S.3d 594, 595-96 (2d Dep’t 2025)). The Court therefore analyzes Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims together. See Lane v. Salesforce, Inc., No. 25 Civ. 9707 (DEH) (HJR), 2026 WL 2364630, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2026) (focusing its analysis on the NYCHRL claim because “the NYCHRL provides the ‘most lenient’ and ‘expansive’ liability standard for sexual harassment”).
Despite the above-mentioned leniency of the NYCHRL, courts have some disagreement as to the breadth of conduct encompassed by the statute. Some decisions in this Circuit have defined sexual harassment under the NYCHRL narrowly, requiring it to involve “conduct or language [that is] romantic, sexual, or lewd.” See Singh, 750 F. Supp. at 257. Others have held that “under the NYCHRL, conduct constituting sexual harassment is unwelcome verbal or physical behavior based on a person’s gender, regardless of whether that behavior is lewd or sexual in nature.” See Toomey, 2026 WL 458244, at *6. Many courts have looked to guidance published by the New York City Commission on Human Rights, the agency responsible for enforcing the NYCHRL, which defines sexual harassment as “unwelcome verbal or physical behavior based on a person’s gender.”5 Stop Sexual Harassment Act, NYC Commission on Human Rights, https://home4.nyc.gov/site/cchr/law/sexual-harassment-training-main.page (last visited Sep’t 9, 2026). “New York law recognizes that sexual harassment is a subset of discrimination.”
Applying these principles, the court found that the allegations here – including a co-worker’s inappropriate remarks about plaintiff’s Teams profile photo and comment that he would “do anything” for her, as well as a characterization of a dispute between plaintiff and another woman as a “cat fight” – failed plead a “viable nonfrivolous or plausible sexual harassment claim.”