In Johnson v. City University of New York, decided Sept. 8, 2014, the Southern District of New York once again clarified that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not prohibit bullying and harassment that is unconnected with legally-protected characteristics.
The court’s first paragraph summarizes the law nicely:
Bullying and harassment have no place in the workplace, but unless they are motivated by the victim’s membership in a protected class, they do not provide the basis for an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (“Title VII”), and any complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) based on them does not constitute “protected activity” under Title VII. Victims of non-discriminatory bullying at the workplace, like those treated unfairly for reasons other than their membership in a protected class, must look outside Title VII to secure what may be their fair due. The Court does not condone bullying, but it cannot read Title VII to protect its victims unless the bullying reflects discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Plaintiff’s complaint did not asset that defendant took any adverse actions against him because of his race, gender/sex, national origin, age, disability, color, or religion, nor did it allege that plaintiff believed that his boss’s bullying and harassment was predicated on any of these protected traits.
He also failed to adequately plead a retaliation claim:
While Johnson identified and complained to his union and to the EEOC about conduct that is undesirable in the workplace, he candidly admits that there was not any nexus between the complained-of conduct and Johnson’s membership in a protected class. Johnson might have believed that any bullying, regardless of whether it was motivated by impermissible discrimination, constituted a violation of Title VII, but a mere subjective good faith belief is insufficient; the belief must be reasonable and characterized by objective good faith. …
[I]t is objectively unreasonable to believe that complaining about poor treatment in the workplace entirely unrelated to any trait, protected or otherwise, is a “protected activity” under Title VII. Even under the liberal pro se pleading standard, Johnson’s Complaint therefore fails to plausibly allege that he possessed a reasonable, good-faith belief that he engaged in protected activity.
Moreover, even if [Johnson] had possessed such a belief, nothing in [his] behavior, as described in [his] complaint, would have allowed [his] employer to reasonably have understood that [Johnson’s] opposition was directed at conduct prohibited by Title VII. At this stage in the case, Johnson’s complaint adequately alleges that CUNY was aware of the substance of his complaints. But what CUNY knew—that Johnson’s Chair was bullying and being rude to him—would not put it on notice that Johnson intended to complain about activity prohibited by Title VII.
The court therefore granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).