In Frederick v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., No. 15-1065, 2016 WL 6518812 (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2016), the Second Circuit reminds us that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects against only a subset of arguably unfair workplace conduct.
In affirming the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s employment discrimination complaint, the court explained:
To state a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must allege that the employer took adverse action against her at least in part for a discriminatory reason, and she may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.[] In particular, [a]n inference of discrimination can arise from circumstances including, but not limited to, the employer’s criticism of the plaintiff’s performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge. …
We additionally conclude that, as to her termination, Frederick did not allege facts giving rise to a plausible inference that she was fired due to her race, color, or national origin. Rather, she alleged that a Union officer and a newly hired secretary conspired to have her fired so that they could hire “people they know” and elect favorable board members. Title VII does not forbid [ ] favoritism, nepotism, or cronyism, so long as it is not premised on animus against a protected class.[] The complaint did not allege any facts supporting an inference that these individuals were motivated by a prohibited animus. (Emphasis added.)